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The United States has unusually high rates of violence among developed nations, including the 
victimization of and perpetration by youth.  Using Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) as the 
theoretical framework, this study analyzes the relationships between social institutions and crime 
and the interactive relationships among the institutions in a sample of Virginia localities. 
Multivariate analyses are conducted to produce additive and multiplicative models, and simple 
slope analyses are conducted to clarify interaction/moderation effects.  Findings yield mixed 
support for IAT.  Localities with higher levels of monthly welfare per recipient (a measure of 
polity) have lower juvenile violent crime arrest rates, and welfare moderates the relationship 
between income inequality and juvenile violent crime arrests.  Controlling for all variables, no 
  
 
 
support was found for the direct effects of any other institution on juvenile violent crime arrests.  
Policy recommendations include maintenance of welfare programs and improvement of work 
participation supplementary programs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
According to the Heritage Foundation (2017), the United States ranks 17th in the world on 
the Index of Economic Freedom with high scores in the areas of free market and property rights.  
While some scholars and politicians have praised and supported these capitalist qualities 
(Bjørnskov & Paldam, 2012; Levitt, 1983), other theorists question whether these qualities and 
the general economy are inappropriately placed on a pedestal (Marks, 2012; Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1995).  Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) particularly asserts that over-idolization of 
economic values leads to detrimental results, namely exceptionally high crime rates (Rosenfeld 
& Messner, 1995). 
Reports show that the United States is a top contender for having the highest homicide 
rates among developed nations (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004; Cook & Khmilevska, 2005; 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 2010; Grinshteyn & Hemenway, 2016; van 
Dijk & Kangaspunta, 2000).  According to analyses of 2010 World Health Organization data, 
American youths are at greater risk of being victims of homicide than youths in other high-
income nations: 3.4 times more likely for Americans aged five to 14 years old and 14.0 times 
more likely for Americans aged 15 to 24 (Grinshteyn & Hemenway, 2016).  Furthermore, violent 
victimization by minors in the United States occurs at a greater rate than violent victimization 
committed by adults (3.5 times greater) (Oudekerk & Morgan, 2016). 
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Simple observance of the above facts (American pride in its economy and American 
crime and victimization rates) appear to support IAT.  Proving such a relationship is not so 
simple, however.  IAT states that overvaluation of the economy and devaluation of the 
institutions of education, family, and polity result in a breakdown of social norms (Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1995).  Theoretically, anomie, the breakdown of social norms, brings forth greater 
crime rates (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995).  Accordingly, the current study applies IAT to 
examine the statistical relationships among the economy, noneconomic institutions (polity, 
family, and education), and Virginia juvenile violent crime arrest rates for a sample of counties 
and cities in Virginia. 
Problem Statement 
The decision on how to measure crime (whether to use crimes reported to the police, 
police service calls, victimization statistics, or arrest rates as a proxy measure) impacts the results 
yielded and conclusions drawn from statistical analyses (Decker & Kohfeld, 1985; European 
Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 2010; Lauritsen, Rezey, & Heimer, 2016).  Due to 
time constraints, lack of publications on rates of juvenile-perpetrated crimes reported to the 
police, and difficulty in obtaining victimization data, this study utilizes arrest data.  Decker and 
Kohfeld (1985) and Puzzanchera (2013) argue that arrest data are inferior measures of crime 
because arrests measure police activity or contact with the justice system.  Juvenile arrests may 
underestimate the full extent of juvenile delinquency and criminality.  Yet, arrests serve as a 
good proxy in the case of juveniles, because by the time of arrest, justice officials have 
determined the perpetrator is likely a juvenile rather than an adult.  In consideration of these 
reasons, the present study will discuss juvenile arrest rates. 
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National and Virginia Trends 
Although crime is a persisting problem in the United States, violent index crimes (defined 
as aggravated assault, murder/nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, and robbery) has significantly 
decreased nationwide (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016a; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2016b).  According to the National Center for Juvenile Justice (2015), the national juvenile arrest 
rate for juveniles aged 10 to 17 for violent index crimes was 295.4 per 100,000 population in 
1980, peaked in 1994 at 497.4, and declined to almost half of 1980’s rate in 2014: 157.8 per 
100,000 population (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: National Center for Juvenile Justice. (2015). [Table of juvenile arrest rates by offense, sex, and race for 
1980-2014]. Law enforcement & juvenile crime: Juvenile arrest rate trends. Retrieved from 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201 
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Figure 2 
Sources: Council on Virginia’s Future. (2016). Juvenile intakes. Retrieved from 
http://vaperforms.virginia.gov/indicators/publicsafety/juvenileIntakes.php 
 
National Center for Juvenile Justice. (2015). [Table of juvenile arrest rates by offense, sex, and race for 1980-
2014]. Law enforcement & juvenile crime: Juvenile arrest rate trends. Retrieved from 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Virginia, any person under the age of 18 may be arrested and adjudicated for criminal 
offenses (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2016).  Some cases occur where children under the 
age of 10 are arrested for simple assault and burglary, for example (Virginia State Police, 2012).  
Because each state determines its own threshold for the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
(Child Rights International Network, 2017; National Juvenile Defender Center, 2016; UNICEF, 
n.d.), policy regarding age applicable for arrest also varies across states.  Hence, comparative 
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national data on juvenile arrests refer to ages 10 to 17.  Agencies reporting Virginia juvenile 
arrest rates also report rates on youth aged 10 to 17.  The Virginia State Police, however, publish 
juvenile arrest counts which include all youth under the age of 18. 
Regarding juvenile violent crime arrest rates, Virginia ranked 38 highest of all states in 
2010 (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2014).  Virginia’s ranking is markedly lower than 
that of its neighbors Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky which rank 2, 4, and 19 respectively 
(National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2014).  The Virginia juvenile violent crime arrest rate of 
youths aged 10 to 17 was about 150 arrests per 100,000 population in 1986, then peaked at 270 
per 100,000 population in 1995 a year after the national arrest rate peaked (Department of 
Criminal Justice Services, 2016).  The arrest rate declined to 76 arrests per 100,000 population in  
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Figure 3 
Source: Department of Criminal Justice Services. (2016). Virginia crime and arrest trends 2006-2015. 
Richmond, VA: Author. Retrieved from 
https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/research/virginia-crime-and-
arrest-trends-2006-2015.pdf 
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2012 (Council on Virginia’s Future, 2016a).  Between 2006 and 2015, the juvenile violent crime 
arrest rate for youths aged 10 to 17 years old declined almost 50% (Department of Criminal 
Justice Services, 2016).   
The downward trend of arrests apparent at the national level is also apparent at the state 
level, with peaks and dips at similar times (see Figure 2).  A comparison of Virginia juvenile 
arrest rates and adult arrest rates for violent index crimes reveals the juvenile arrest rate was 
higher than the adult arrest rate for about 20 years until 2012 (see Figure 3) (Department of 
Criminal Justice Services, 2016). 
Institutional Anomie Theory and Arrest Rates 
 Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) states that an imbalance in power among the 
institutions of education, family, economy, and government/polity results in greater crime rates 
(here substituted with juvenile arrest rates) (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995).  The relationship 
among these institutions will be discussed in chapter 2.  Below is a discussion of trends and 
direct impacts of the social institutions education (Maume & Lee, 2003), family (Kposowa, 
Breault, & Harrison, 1995), economy (Currie, 2013), and government/polity (Administration for 
Children and Families, 2016) on crime/arrest.  A brief deliberation of offender’s age (Liu, 2015) 
and sex (Connell, Steeger, Schroeder, Franks, & Tebes, 2016) follows. 
Institutions of education and family.  Poor academic performance is a risk factor for 
individual delinquency and criminal offending (Chung, Mulvey, & Steinberg, 2011; Yun, 
Cheong, & Walsh, 2014).  At the aggregate level, educational expenditures per pupil, which 
affects academic performance, may impact arrest rates (Jefferson, 2005; Koshal, Koshal, & 
Gupta, 2004; Maume & Lee, 2003). In the United States, expenditures on education have 
experienced trends opposite to juvenile arrest rates: the national percentage of GDP spent on 
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education generally increased from 1986 to 2011 (World Bank, 2016).  These investments have 
generally increased at the state level as well (Virginia Department of Education, 2012-2016).  
Per pupil expenditures vary between states and localities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015; Virginia 
Department of Education, 2012-2016), so juvenile arrest rates are expected to reflect similar 
variation. 
State of the family and family members influence juvenile delinquency as well (Burt, 
Barnes, McGue, & Iacono, 2008; Rhoades, Leve, Eddy, & Chamberlain, 2016).  At the micro-
level, parental divorce affects decisions to engage in youth delinquency (Burt et al., 2008; 
Rhoades et al., 2016).  At the macro-level, divorce rate is a strong predictor of homicide in 
American counties (Maume & Lee, 2003) and general crime in rural counties (Kposowa et al., 
1995).  Nationally, the divorce rate decreased from 4.0 divorces per 1,000 population in 2000 to 
3.1 divorces per 1,000 population in 2015 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017a).  
Virginia divorce rates have closely followed the national trend: rates decreased from 4.4 divorces 
per 1,000 population to 3.3 per 1,000 population (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2017b). 
Institution of economy and polity: Poverty and welfare.  Economic conditions such as 
economic disparity, unemployment, and poverty have close relation to and even purportedly 
cause crime (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Currie, 2013; De Coster, 
Heimer, & Wittrock, 2006; Travis, 1998).  To complicate matters, poverty adversely affects 
academic performance, which in turn increases juvenile risk of offending (Chung et al., 2011; 
Council on Virginia’s Future, 2016b). 
National conditions of poverty have undergone trends similar to national juvenile arrest 
rates.  According to a report prepared by social policy specialist Gabe (2015) for presentation to 
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Congress, the national child poverty rate peaked at 21.8% in 1983 before decreasing, then 
increasing again in the early 1990s.  From 1996 to 2006, child poverty rates steadily decreased 
until 2007 when the United States experienced a recession and peaked in 2010 with a child 
poverty rate of 22.0% (Administration for Children and Families, 2016).  It has since begun to 
decline once again.  In 2011, Virginia ranked 8th among 50 states for the highest level of child 
poverty (Center for American Progress, 2017a).  In 2016, although Virginia’s child poverty rate 
remained stable, the state dropped in raking to 13th (Center for American Progress, 2017b).  The 
government attempts to alleviate economic disadvantage through welfare programs such as the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which disseminates financial aid to 
impoverished households (Administration for Children and Families, 2016; Batton & Jensen, 
2002; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997). 
Demographic factors: Age and sex.  Offender demographic characteristics are often the 
first thread of discourse when discussing crime.  Scholars especially pinpoint age as an 
influential factor for crime rates: the greatest likelihood for delinquency occurs during 
adolescence (Kim, Bushway, & Tsao, 2016; Liu, 2015; Piquero, 2015).  Thus, any decrease in 
the total number of adolescents within the greater population is expected to result in decreased 
arrest rates.  Nationally, the juvenile population has declined from 35.9% of the overall 
population in 1960 to 24% in 2010 (Howden & Meyer, 2011).  In comparison, Virginia’s youth 
population has remained relatively stable with marginal change: the juvenile population 
decreased from 24.7% of the overall population in 2005 to 22.3% in 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2006, U.S. Census Bureau, 2016b). 
As for sex, researchers agree that there exists some difference between males and females 
regarding criminogenic risk factors and subsequent criminal/delinquent behavior (Applin & 
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Messner, 2015; Bright et al., 2017; Connell et al., 2016; Hilterman, Bongers, Nicholls, & van 
Nieuwenhuizen, 2016; Pollock, Hill, Menard, & Elliott, 2016; Rhoades et al., 2016).  Males are 
shown to be at greater risk for committing crime than females (Applin & Messner, 2015; Pollock 
et al., 2016), so a greater male population is expected to correlate with an increase in arrests.  
From 2000 to 2010, the United States male population has increased at a greater rate than the 
female population, with a percent change of 9.9 compared to 9.5 respectively (Howden & Meyer, 
2011).  Virginia’s male population marginally grew between 2005 and 2015: the sex ratio of 
males for every 100 females increased from 95.1 in 2005 to 96.9 in 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2006, U.S. Census Bureau, 2016b). 
Purpose of Study 
 This study purports to ascertain which institutions and relationships among institutions, 
when controlling for demographic factors, best explains variation in juvenile violent crime 
arrests across counties and cities in Virginia.  As the study’s theoretical base, IAT examines and 
explains the relationships among the social institutions of economy, education, family, and the 
government or polity and their effect on serious crimes (crimes which cause significant financial 
or physical harm) (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995).  To examine these relationships, this study 
includes the following county and city level variables: demographic measures (age, sex, and 
race); economic measures (income inequality, child poverty rate, and unemployment rate); 
noneconomic measures (average monthly welfare per person adjusted for cost-of-living, divorce-
to-marriage ratio, and per pupil expenditures); and juvenile violent crime arrest rates as the 
outcome variable. 
 Few scholars have used IAT to study juvenile behavior (Groß & Haußmann, 2011; 
Muftic, 2006; Stults & Falco, 2014), and none in the context of juvenile arrests.  In a more recent 
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publication, Applin and Messner (2015) insist that IAT is intended for holistic criminological 
study.  They contend that because IAT is intended as a holistic theory, IAT analysis requires 
examination of not only social institutions as they relate to crime, but also gender stratification as 
it relates to institutions and crime.  If this assertion is true, then more work should be done to 
understand how the theory applies to juvenile justice. 
 Additionally, no other researchers have measured the economic institution by child 
poverty rate.  If the economy dominates the noneconomic institutions (as is theorized by IAT, 
discussed in chapter 2), economy may be better measured by child poverty rate than other 
indicators selected by scholars.  While poverty rate describes the economic conditions of whole 
households, child poverty rate describes the economic conditions of individual youth, who may 
be younger than the working age and thus unable to work.  Child poverty, then, is not only more 
relevant for a study on juveniles, but better reflects the severity of a dominating economy.  Thus, 
this study aims to fill the gaps in IAT literature on the subject matter of juveniles and regarding 
child poverty. 
The present study may also make an impact in policy recommendations.  If relationships 
among social institutions reveal considerable imbalance and significant effects on juvenile arrest, 
then communities may adjust direction of future policy, including budgetary plans, social 
campaigning to advocate a shift in community priorities, agency administrative policies, and 
legal protections. 
 In the pages to follow, chapter 2 will review the origins and foundations of IAT, review 
empirical studies on IAT, and list this researcher’s hypotheses.  Chapter 3 will describe this 
project’s methodology, including the sources of data, sample size, variable selection and the 
rationale for the selection, and the analytical model.  Chapter 4 will review this study’s results.  
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Chapter 5 will summarize the results, discuss whether findings support this researcher’s 
hypotheses, offer policy recommendations, discuss limitations, and make recommendations for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 Durkheim’s (1933) Theory of Anomie and Merton’s (1938) Classical Strain Theory 
informed Rosenfeld and Messner’s (1995) Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT).  This section first 
describes IAT’s theoretical predecessors, then discusses IAT’s articulated theoretical 
propositions and the measurement of key theoretical concepts.  This section concludes with a 
review of empirical studies of IAT and their main findings. 
Theoretical Origins 
 IAT’s fundamental tenets pivot on the Greek term “anomie,” which refers to a lack of 
social norms/regulations and order (Besnard, 2015).  Before Rosenfeld and Messner (1995) ever 
discussed this concept, Durkheim first outlined anomie in his written works Division of Labor in 
Society (1933) and Suicide (1951) with his Theory of Anomie.  Merton (1938), who also 
impacted Rosenfeld and Messner’s development of IAT, illustrated anomie in his Classical 
Strain Theory. 
Theory of Anomie.  Durkheim (1933) explained that society and the population are 
unified by common values and goals.  Quick changes in social structure (i.e. political or social 
revolutions) cause diminishment or disintegration of norms and regulations.  This 
diminishment/disintegration is called anomie.  Because of anomie, citizens no longer have 
restraints against their greed.  Without restraint, people do not feel attached to the community by 
common values, and they do not feel obligated to serve collectivist goals.  Citizens who do not 
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serve the community are more likely to be labeled as criminals.  Additionally, people who are 
unrestrained from lives of greed are more likely to act violently if they subsequently experience 
any restrictions.  Thus, high levels of anomie may result in phenomena such as an increase in 
individuals being labeled as criminal offenders (Durkheim, 1933), increase in homicides, or 
increase in self-homicides or suicides (Durkheim, 1951). 
Classical Strain Theory.  Merton (1938) explained anomie as a phenomenon which 
affects social stratification of societies in which success is measured through monetary gain.  In 
these societies, success should be achieved by individuals through conventional means in 
accordance with social norms (i.e. education and legal occupation), but citizens experience an 
equal pressure to accumulate wealth regardless of opportunity and ease of access to these means.  
When the goals are overemphasized and obstacles to success through conventional means exist, 
people experience strain.  This strain creates a condition of “cultural chaos,” otherwise known as 
anomie. 
Whether persons internalize both conventional means and conventional cultural goals 
affects how they adapt to anomie.  Merton (1938) describes five adaptations: conformity, 
innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. Of these adaptations, conformists are citizens 
who have completely internalized the value of conventional means and cultural goals.  They are 
satisfied with pursuit of goals using only legal means, regardless of whether wealth is ever 
achieved (pursuit itself is viewed as a form of success).  Ritualists accept that conventional 
means of education and careers are essential according to social norms, but they have not 
internalized cultural goals.  Ritualists only passively (ritualistically) participate in conventional 
activities (education and career) and do not actively pursue the goals.  Retreatists reject both 
goals and conventional means and do not participate in conventional activities.  They are often 
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frequent drug users.  Rebels completely reject the goals and appropriate means and choose to 
reform society and institute alternative goals and means.  They are essentially anarchists.  
Meanwhile, citizens who have internalized capitalist goals but have not internalized the necessity 
of conventional means create a new means to obtain success.  These innovationists turn to 
unconventional, illegal means (crime) to obtain the wealth they seek (Merton, 1938). 
IAT Theoretical Propositions 
 IAT consists of three key theoretical components: 1) anomie, introduced above, 2) 
culture, and 3) the social structure of institutional control (social institutions) (Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1995). 
Anomie.  To reiterate, Durkheim (1933, 1951) stated that anomie is the dissolution of 
regulatory norms and lack of restraint against greed, while Merton’s (1938) anomie results from 
an overemphasis of cultural goals and strain from inability to achieve said goals.  Whereas 
Durkheim (1933, 1951) described anomie as a condition which causes an increase in certain 
phenomena, and Merton (1938) described anomie as a condition to which people adapt, 
Rosenfeld and Messner (1995) place anomie in the context of capitalism to discuss the role of 
social institutions in people’s lives.  Rosenfeld and Messner (1995), IAT’s authors, theorize 
anomie as an imbalance in power between social institutions.  The imbalance is a consequence of 
overemphasis of the economy and devaluation of noneconomic institutions.  Institutional 
imbalance increases anomie, which results in increased economic pressure to commit crime and 
weakened institutional controls to restrain criminal behavior (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995). 
Culture.  Rosenfeld and Messner (1995) discuss anomie in the context of capitalism, 
particularly American capitalism, which they say is characterized by an American Dream 
culture.  They describe Dream culture with four value orientations: fetishism of money/monetary 
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rewards, achievement, universalism, and individualism.  To explain in brief, these orientations 
state that 1) citizens must obtain monetary rewards to gain material success (fetishism of 
money); 2) material success dictates citizens’ social success and worth (achievement); 3) all 
citizens must strive to obtain money (universalism); and 4) achievement is expected to be 
completed on an individual, competitive basis (individualism). 
Social institutions.  IAT outlines four major institutions in its discussion of society: the 
economy, education, family, and polity (also known as the political system or government).  
When there is no anomie, these institutions cooperate to ensure the survival of the overall 
community and the emotional, mental, and physical wellbeing of the population.  Because 
American Dream culture emphasizes monetary achievement, however, the perceived importance 
and ascribed power of the economic institution dwarf the noneconomic institutions’ importance 
and power.  With this domination, economic values penetrate the noneconomic institutions and 
devalue their roles, so that noneconomic institutions are unwittingly forced to accommodate and 
serve the purpose of the economy.  Moreover, noneconomic institutions cannot effectively 
function without significant monetary funds.  For example, an educational system with 
insufficient funds may be unable to provide an effective teacher to student ratio, and the family 
cannot provide for their members’ emotional and physical needs without jobs outside of the 
home.  Below is a more in-depth discussion of the institutions’ intended roles and their altered 
roles as a result of institutional imbalance (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995). 
Economy.  The economy adapts to changes in limited resources and commodities.  When 
there is an abundance or excess in resources, the economy provides a plethora of occupations to 
manufacture resources into usable products and commodities for the general populace.  When 
resources decline, the economy adjusts the number of available jobs and product output to help 
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ensure the survival of society.  With high levels of anomie, however, economic values and norms 
permeate into the areas of life previously governed by noneconomic institutions.  Noneconomic 
institutions begin to use economic terms (such as “profit,” “accountability,” and “division of 
labor”) in their everyday proceedings, and interactions with the noneconomic institutions are 
based on an economic reward system (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995). 
Polity.  The polity performs regulatory duties to achieve collectivist goals which benefit 
all citizens.  Such regulation includes oversight of interaction between the institutions (through 
the passage of laws) and the provision/protection of public safety.  Thus, the polity establishes 
policies which restrict and counterbalance the influence of the other institutions, and establishes 
and maintains a justice system for public protection.  When dominated by the economy, the 
polity is often preoccupied with taxation and regulating consumerism (Rosenfeld & Messner, 
1995). 
Family.  The family is a source of informal social control that provides socialization into 
conventional society.  This institution prepares family members for success as pro-social, law-
abiding citizens.  In addition to teaching its members socially acceptable values and norms, the 
family is intended as an emotional sanctuary from the stresses of life and influence of/interaction 
with the other institutions.  When there is anomie due to economic dominance and institutional 
imbalance, families struggle to provide emotional solace because family activities are 
constrained by the work schedule.  Even the worth of each family member is evaluated based on 
their participation in the economy (e.g. working parent v. stay-at-home parent) (Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1995). 
Education.  Like the family, the educational institution teaches individuals conventional, 
prosocial values and norms to become law-abiding citizens.  Citizens pursue knowledge through 
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education, and this pursuit enables them to experience personal development and enrichment.  
With economic domination, individuals pursue knowledge to increase chances of attaining a 
high-paying career rather than to obtain knowledge itself.  Furthermore, benchmarks for 
knowledge attainment and success are based on a grade system akin to a payment reward system 
(students who best complete assignments receive a highly-valued payment of “A”) (Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1995).   
Crime.  The American Dream culture, which values monetary achievement over any 
other forms of success, contributes to economic domination of noneconomic institutions.  When 
the economy is valued more so than other institutions, and when economic values and norms 
penetrate noneconomic institutions, the result is institutional imbalance and anomie.  
Consequently, the emphasis of culture and institutional imbalance invoke an unrestrained spirit 
of innovation (similar to Merton’s (1938) adaptation of innovation), in which the use of legal 
means for success are de-emphasized (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995).  These conditions result in 
greater crime rates.  Rosenfeld and Messner (1995) initially asserted that IAT explains only 
“serious” crimes (i.e. physically or financially harmful crimes), but they have since retracted this 
limitation. 
Empirical Studies 
 Determining whether IAT is a viable theory is difficult for several reasons: 1) scholars 
cannot agree how to appropriately test IAT (i.e. at what level of measurement, whether tests must 
be cross-national, whether all IAT concepts must be tested to provide support for the theory, or 
whether studies should include tests for moderation effects) (Cancino, Varano, Schafer, & 
Enriquez, 2007; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 
2000), and 2) because IAT concepts are abstract, operationalization of the concepts (i.e. how to 
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measure culture, or which variables appropriately represent institutions) can affect whether 
findings support IAT (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Chamlin & 
Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012).   
Unit of measurement.  Rosenfeld and Messner’s (1995) conception of IAT briefly 
described “American exceptionalism,” or the idea that the United States has unusually high 
crime rates in comparison with other nations because of American Dream culture.  Savolainen 
(2000) thus argues IAT should be studied using only national level data in order to provide cross-
national comparisons and proof of whether American exceptionalism and American Dream 
capitalistic culture exist.  Other criminologists, however, have tested IAT at lower levels of 
aggregation such as American states (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995), counties (Baumer & 
Gustafson, 2007; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003), cities (Baumer & 
Gustafson, 2007; Groß & Haußmann, 2011; Stucky, 2003), and census blocks (Cancino et al., 
2007) to determine the merit of IAT’s other core components: the relationships between the 
institutions and crime.  IAT has even been applied at the micro-level to study individual behavior 
(Groß & Haußmann, 2011; Muftic, 2006; Stults & Falco, 2014).  Because the present study is 
interested in analyzing county and city level data in one state, the following review of literature 
will focus on macro-level studies. 
Crime.  Because of Rosenfeld and Messner’s (1997) initial limitation regarding the 
intended scope of IAT being serious crimes, researchers have often studied IAT in the context of 
violent crimes (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 
2012; Dolliver, 2015; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Hughes et al., 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003; 
Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997).  In addition to enjoying the benefit of theoretical approval, violent 
crimes are more likely to be detected and reported to officials, increasing the likelihood the 
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outcome measure is accurate and reliable (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; 
Dolliver, 2015). 
Operationalization of institutions.  As mentioned previously, scholars debate which 
variables are appropriate for measuring social institutions (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; 
Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012).  Variable selection is essential when 
operationalizing a social institution because it can impact yielded empirical findings and finding 
interpretations (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012).  The following is a 
review of macro-level empirical studies examining the effects of social institutions on crime. 
Economy.  Economic impact on the population has been operationalized primarily 
through three measures: unemployment rate, income inequality, and poverty rate (Batton & 
Jensen, 2002; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 
2012; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2009; 
Savolainen, 2000; Stucky, 2003). 
Studies which assessed the strength or dominance of the economy through 
unemployment rate have produced findings which support IAT: greater unemployment rates are 
positively associated with American national homicide rates (Batton & Jensen, 2002), total crime 
rates in 406 U.S. metropolitan counties (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998), and total crime rates in 958 
U.S. cities (Stucky, 2003).  These statistically significant relationships support the assertion that 
adverse changes in economic conditions adversely affect levels of crime (Batton & Jensen, 2002; 
Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Stucky, 2003). 
Research on income inequality also support that assertion regarding economy and crime: 
in studies of homicide rates in a sample of 49 nations (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008) and 45 
nations (Messner & Rosenfeld), as well as a study on burglary rates in 10 nations (Rosenfeld & 
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Messner, 2009), income inequality had a positive relationship with the outcome.  Higher levels 
of income inequality predicted higher crime rates.  Only Bjerregaard and Cochran’s (2008) 
findings were statistically significant, however, and the direction of the relationship changed in 
Rosenfeld and Messner’s (2009) study when the United States was removed from the sample. 
Hannon and DeFronzo (1998), in their study on metropolitan counties, created a 
deprivation index consisting of percentage of the population that is black, percentage of 
matriarchal households, and the poverty rate.  This deprivation index was statistically significant 
in its positive relationships with property crime rates, violent crime rates, and total crime rates (p 
< 0.001).  This statistically significant relationship further supports IAT’s expectation that 
economic pressures resulting from economic dominance is related to higher levels of crime. 
Family.  While some researchers have operationalized the strength of the family based on 
apparent attachment to the institution by measuring its perceived level of importance (Hughes et 
al., 2015) and average amount of time devoted to family (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007), family is 
not often operationalized in this manner.  IAT studies more consistently utilize variables related 
to divorce (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012; 
Dolliver, 2015; Jensen, 2002; Maume & Lee, 2003; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2009).  Rather than 
representing the strength of the family institution, divorce is an indicator of a weakened, 
disrupted family institution (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Dolliver, 2015).  Divorce disrupts 
family cohesiveness and creates dysfunction (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015), and 
occurrence of divorce suggests less general family commitment (Maume & Lee, 2003).  
Criminologists have thus measured family disruption through divorce-to-marriage ratio (Chamlin 
& Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012; Dolliver, 2015) and divorce rate (Batton & 
Jensen, 2002; Jensen, 2002; Maume & Lee, 2003; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2009). 
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Despite the regular use of family disruption measures, findings have been mixed 
regarding support for IAT.  Maume and Lee (2003), for example, conducted negative binomial 
regression analyses on 454 counties, yielding findings that divorce rate has a significantly strong, 
positive relationship with instrumental homicide rates (p < 0.01) (homicides committed to obtain 
a monetary reward).  Dolliver (2015) found that greater divorce-to-marriage ratios (in which 
divorce rates are higher than marriage rates) are correlated with higher rates of intentional 
homicide in 13 developed nations and 5 transitioning nations, but the finding was statistically 
non-significant.  Maume and Lee’s (2003) and Dolliver’s (2015) results suggest that areas with 
higher levels of divorce also have higher levels of homicide.  Meanwhile, divorce rate was 
insignificantly negatively associated with homicide in Cochran and Bjerregaard’s (2012) 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis on 49 nations.  This final finding directly 
opposes IAT, suggesting locations with greater family disruption may expect lower homicide 
rates. 
Education.  The educational institution has been operationalized the most inconsistently 
across studies.  Dolliver (2015), for example, measured the strength of a nation’s education 
institution through educational access or the percentage of working persons who completed their 
primary school education.  Other criminologists chose to measure educational strength as 
commitment to education (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007) and the extent to which education for the 
sake of knowledge is valued (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008) through student-to-teacher ratio 
(Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008). 
Education has also been operationalized using monetary measures: county level per pupil 
expenditures (Maume & Lee, 2003), percentage of government revenue spent on education in 
counties/cities (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007), and percentage of a nation’s GDP (Cochran & 
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Bjerregaard, 2012).  Dolliver (2015) notes that by operationalizing educational strength through 
monetary-based variables, researchers may be measuring strength of the economy rather than 
education.  Consequently, empirical results may confound the effects of the economic and 
educational institutions, and conclusions drawn from the results may be incorrect (Dolliver, 
2015).  Scholars have defended use of these variables, however, as indication of commitment to 
or support for the educational institution (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Maume & Lee, 2003), and 
as a moderator of the economic-crime relationship (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Cochran & 
Bjerregaard, 2012), which is discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
Using a sample of 24 nonmetropolitan counties and 52 metropolitan areas, Baumer and 
Gustafson (2007) applied IAT to an analysis of instrumental crimes (motor vehicle theft, 
burglaries, larcenies, and robberies), which are crimes committed to obtain a monetary reward.  
Their measure of educational strength (percentage of government expenditures on education) had 
a statistically significant negative association with instrumental crime rates.  Maume and Lee 
(2003) used county level per pupil expenditures as a measure of education and found that 
education was not significantly related to instrumental homicide, expressive homicide (homicide 
resulting from an emotional outburst or argument), or total homicide rate.  While Baumer and 
Gustafson’s (2007) educational measure demonstrated support for IAT, in that areas with greater 
government educational expenditures had lower instrumental crime rates, Maume and Lee’s 
(2003) measure did not provide support for the effects of education on county level homicide 
rates. 
Polity.  The political institution oversees public safety (Dolliver, 2015; Groß & 
Haußmann, 2011) and achievement of collective goals (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Dolliver, 
2015).  As such, polity has often been operationalized as voter turnout (Baumer & Gustafson, 
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2007; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Cancino et al., 2007; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran 
& Bjerregaard, 2012; Maume & Lee, 2003), welfare receipt (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; 
Cancino et al., 2007; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998), or government decommodification policies 
(Batton & Jensen, 2002; Jensen, 2002; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997). 
Voter turnout represents a population’s commitment to the polity in participating in 
processes aimed to achieve collective goals.  Using data for 1,106 census block groups from San 
Antonio, Cancino and colleagues (2007) found that voter participation had a significant 
association with violent crime rates.  Cochran and Bjerregaard (2012) also found that voter 
participation was negatively related to homicide rates among a sample of 49 countries.  Both 
studies indicate that areas with higher rates of voter participation have lower rates of crime, as 
compared to those areas with less voter participation.  These findings are expected according to 
IAT and are supportive of the theory. 
Decommodification, another measure of political strength, refers to government policies 
which reduce citizen dependence on the economy, ensuring citizens can maintain a satisfactory 
standard of living and participate in noneconomic activities (e.g. getting married, raising 
children, voting, pursuing a college education) without needing to heavily rely on economic 
activities (e.g. employment) (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 
2000).  Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) created a decommodification index which included 
measures of universality of welfare coverage (whether welfare receipt is restricted by a person’s 
current life situation), welfare accessibility, and whether welfare aid can completely substitute 
occupational income.  Their decommodification index assessed unemployment welfare aid, sick 
leave pay, and elderly pension in a sample of 45 nations, and it was negatively associated with 
homicide rates (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997).  Nations that offer better access to more extensive 
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welfare programs have lower homicide rates.  This association was robust – the relationship 
remained moderately strong even when accounting for economic discrimination, income 
inequality, sex ratio, and a “development index” (infant mortality, population growth, urban 
development, GNP per capita, life expectancy, and proportion of the population that is 65 years 
old or older) (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 1402).  Batton and Jensen (2002) challenged the 
robustness of Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) results, however, noting the change in 
significance and magnitude of decommodification’s effect on homicide when the United States 
or Syria were excluded from their sample.  
Cancino and colleagues (2007) used a measure of welfare that captures the amount of 
dollar vouchers per Section 8 housing unit.  They (2007) found that higher levels of welfare are 
related to lower levels of violent crime at the block group level.  Thus, census block groups with 
higher amounts of Section 8 housing dollar vouchers had lower violent crime rates, as compared 
to those block groups with less welfare support.  Other studies have used a composite measure of 
welfare to capture types of support provided by the polity.  For example, Hannon and DeFronzo 
(1998) and Baumer and Gustafson (2007) created a composite measure of welfare by combining 
average monthly welfare per recipient adjusted for cost-of-living with percentage of families 
living under the poverty line who are also welfare recipients.  Using this measure, Hannon and 
DeFronzo (1998) found that welfare support was significantly and negatively associated with 
violent crime.  However, Baumer and Gustafson (2007), using the same measure did not find a 
statistical relationship between the welfare composite measure and instrumental crime (Baumer 
& Gustafson, 2007).  When polity strength is operationalized as decommodification or welfare, 
findings generally adhere to IAT expectations: higher levels of decommodification and welfare 
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predict lower levels of crime (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Cancino et al., 2007; Hannon & 
DeFronzo, 1998). 
Moderated relationships.  The above review of literature discussed only additive 
relationships.  Additive relationships predict the independent variables will have direct effects on 
the outcome (Fox, 1947; Treiman, 2009).  Many scholars do not believe that additive 
relationships fully describe Rosenfeld and Messner’s (1997) IAT (Cancino et al., 2007; Chamlin 
& Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).  Many argue that 
Rosenfeld and Messner’s description of the causal process underlying IAT implies a moderation 
effect (Cancino et al., 2007; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003; 
Savolainen, 2000). 
A moderation effect occurs when an independent variable’s relationship with the 
dependent variable varies in strength or direction by levels of a third variable (the moderator) 
(Fairchild & MacKinnon, 2009; Field, 2013).  Statistically, the independent and moderator 
variables interact and cause variation in the dependent variable (Dawson, 2014; Verma, 2013). 
Criminologists have found moderation effects which support IAT.  For example, several 
researchers have found that decommodification and welfare, which measure strength of the 
polity, moderate the relationship between economic factors and crime rates (Cancino et al., 2007; 
Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).  Cancino and colleagues 
(2007) found that interaction between concentrated disadvantage (an index variable measuring 
unemployment, poverty, racial minority, and matriarchal households with children) and welfare 
significantly reduced crime at the block group level.  Specifically, block groups that have higher 
concentrated disadvantage and greater welfare per person are associated with lower property and 
violent crime rates.  Others have also found evidence for the interaction between economic 
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inequality and education on crime (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008).  Bjerregaard and Cochran 
(2008) reported that countries with high levels of income inequality have higher levels of 
homicide; this relationship is stronger for nations with weaker educational systems (high 
illiteracy rates and low teacher-to-student ratios). 
Some tests of moderation effects have yielded results that did not support IAT.  Chamlin 
and Cochran (1995) reported that weakened family institution (indicated by high divorce-to-
marriage ratio) moderated the relationship between unemployment and property crimes in the 
opposite expected direction: states with greater divorce-to-marriage ratios and high 
unemployment rates were associated with lower property crime rates.  Bjerregaard and Cochran 
(2008) tested the moderating effect of family disruption (an index variable combining percentage 
of working women and divorce rate) on welfare expenditures (which indicated weakened 
economy in their study) and found that nations with greater welfare expenditures and greater 
divorce had greater homicide rates.  IAT predicts that a weakened family institution and strong 
economy should result in higher crime rates, while a strong polity should result in lower crime 
rates.  Chamlin and Cochran’s (1995) finding directly opposes IAT.  While Bjerregaard and 
Cochran’s (2008) finding does not seem to support IAT, they explain that their finding may still 
support IAT because a nation may have higher welfare expenditures in reaction to high family 
disruption levels. 
Research Question 
 The current study explores whether IAT can explain juvenile violent crime arrest rates in 
counties and cities in the commonwealth of Virginia.  This study will examine the direct and 
moderating effects of economic and noneconomic institutions on juvenile violent crime arrests.  
After reviewing the theory and literature, this researcher makes the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: Localities that have higher levels of economic dominance (measured as 
higher income inequality, higher unemployment rates, or higher child 
poverty rates) will have higher juvenile violence index crime arrest rates. 
Hypothesis 2: Localities with stronger polities (higher adjusted average monthly welfare 
per person) will have lower juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
Hypothesis 3: The polity (measured as adjusted average monthly welfare per person) will 
moderate the effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrests. 
Hypothesis 4: Localities with higher levels of family disruption (measured as higher 
divorce-to-marriage ratio) will have higher juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates. 
Hypothesis 5: Family disruption (measured as divorce-to-marriage ratio) will moderate 
the effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
Hypothesis 6: Localities with stronger educational institutions (measured as higher per 
pupil education expenditures) will have lower juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates. 
Hypothesis 7: Education (measured as per pupil education expenditure) will moderate the 
effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 
 
 
Sources of Data 
 The present study examines data from 2011 to 2015 that was collected from public 
sources and did not include any identifiable private information as the level of inquiry is at 
county and city level.  The data were derived from the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Kids Count 
Data Center, the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics, the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, the Virginia Department of Education’s 
Superintendent’s Annual Report, the Virginia Department of Social Services’ Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families Report, and the Virginia State Police’s Crime in Virginia 
publication.  For localities such as cities and counties, the U.S. Census Bureau provides 5-year 
averages rather than annual data.  Because a majority of the variables of interest (six of 11) were 
derived from the U.S. Census Bureau, the annual data for all other variables for the years 2011 to 
2015 were summed and averaged to improve comparability with the U.S. Census Bureau data.  
(See Appendix A for list of variables gathered from each data source.) 
 Virginia has 38 independent cities and 95 counties (n=133).  In some cases, the Virginia 
Department of Education and Virginia Department of Social Services reported data for a county 
and city in combination rather than separately, making it impossible to analyze these localities 
individually.  Consequently, 11 counties/cities were excluded from the sample.  Additionally, 
Bedford City changed its status from independent city to township in 2013 and was re-
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incorporated into Bedford County after 2013.  Because the city’s status changed during the 
study’s time frame of interest, and the U.S. Census Bureau changed its method of reporting for 
Bedford City and County after 2013, Bedford County is also excluded from the sample.  The 
Virginia State Police noted in its 2015 Crime in Virginia Report that Henrico County’s arrest 
counts were not verified by the Henrico County Police.  Thus, Henrico County is excluded from 
the sample as well.  Altogether, 13 localities were excluded from study (n=13): Bedford County, 
Fairfax County, Greensville County, Henrico County, James City County, Roanoke County, 
York County, Emporia City, Fairfax City, Falls Church City, Poquoson City, Salem City, and 
Williamsburg City.  The final sample consists of 120 counties and cities. (See Appendix B for a 
case summary) 
Variables 
 All variables included in this study are continuous and are averages for the years 2011 to 
2015.  The rationale for variable selection and descriptions for their interpretation are below.  If 
the variable was subjected to further adjustment from its raw data form, the process of 
transformation is explained as well.  All control variables, the Gini coefficient, and divorce and 
marriage data were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Other data sources are discussed in 
the appropriate sections. 
 Dependent.  The present study is interested in explaining juvenile behavior, specifically 
juvenile arrests for violent index crimes.  Whereas previous criminologists have utilized the 
number or rates of violent crimes reported to police or government agencies as the dependent 
variable (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012; Hannon & DeFronzo, 
1998; Maume & Lee, 2003), this researcher uses juvenile arrests for violent index crimes 
because publications of juvenile-perpetrated violent crimes reported to the police either do not 
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exist or are not publicly available.  While the Virginia State Police does not publish such service 
calls regarding juvenile-perpetrated violent crimes, the agency does publish separate arrest count 
data for juveniles and adults for all Virginia localities annually. 
Juvenile arrest rates for violent index crimes were calculated using raw arrest counts 
published annually by the Virginia State Police (2012-2016).  The Virginia State Police reports 
separate arrest counts for each arrestable offense: murder, negligent manslaughter, kidnapping, 
forcible sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault/intimidation, arson, 
extortion/blackmail, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, counterfeiting/forgery, fraud, 
embezzlement, stolen property, vandalism, drug/narcotic offenses, nonforcible sex offenses, 
pornography, gambling, prostitution, bribery, weapon law violations, bad checks, 
curfew/loitering/vagrancy, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, drunkenness, 
nonforcible family offenses, liquor law violations, being a peeping tom, being a runaway, 
trespass of real property, conspiracy, and “all [other non-traffic offenses].” 
The current study uses the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (2016) definition of violent 
index crimes (aggravated assault, murder or nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, and robbery) to 
select the appropriate figures from the Virginia State Police raw arrest counts for rate calculation.  
Because the Virginia State Police does not report arrests for rape separate from other forcible sex 
offenses, this study includes all forcible sex offense counts, including forcible rape.  The 
Virginia State Police defines forcible sex offenses as forcible rape, sexual assault using an object 
or tool, forcible sodomy, and forcible fondling.  The outcome variable was created by dividing 
the average number of juvenile arrests from the years 2011 through 2015 by the average number 
of juveniles aged under 18 for the same period, and multiplied by 100,000.  Thus, this juvenile 
violent crime arrest rate reflects the average number of juvenile violent crime arrests per 100,000 
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people.  The Virginia localities included in the sample have juvenile violent crime arrest rates 
ranging from 0 arrests per 100,000 population to 132.46 arrests per 100,000 population. 
Independent: Economic institution. The strength of the economy is measured here by 
three different variables: Gini index of income inequality, unemployment rate, and child poverty 
rate.  Multiple studies have used the Gini index or unemployment rate as an economic indicator 
(Batton & Jensen, 2002; Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Chamlin & 
Cochran, 1995; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000).  
Few, if any, studies have used child poverty rates. 
Gini index of income inequality.  The Gini index (also known as the Gini coefficient) 
measures relative economic deprivation (Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012), a household’s economic 
condition as it relates to another household in a given population.  In other words, this variable 
measures the economic disparity between the wealthiest households and the least wealthy.  
Higher income inequality, as measured by a higher Gini coefficient, should indicate that there 
exists greater economic dominance and more economic pressure, and thus higher levels of 
anomie (Maume & Lee, 2003).  The Gini coefficient scale spans from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a 
geographic area with complete income equality between households, and 1 indicating complete 
inequality (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016c).  Given the original scale, Gini index values are ratios.  
To change the ratios into whole numbers and allow for easier interpretation, the researcher 
multiplied the Gini index by 100, so that the range of the indicator now spans from 0 to 100. 
Unemployment rate.  Unemployment rate measures a distinct aspect of economic impact 
different from the Gini coefficient.  Whereas the Gini coefficient evaluates economic conditions 
of household units, the unemployment rate considers the population’s economic health as 
measured by employment status.  To illustrate, a wealthy household does not necessarily require 
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all household members be employed.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) publishes 
unemployment rate data monthly but also provides annual rates.  The unemployment rate is an 
objective measure which aggregates individual-level economic conditions (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2014).  This variable is a percentage of people who are part of the work force but do 
not currently have a job and are currently seeking a job or were seeking a job in the past four 
weeks at the time of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data collection (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2014).  The unemployment rate ranges from 0% to 100%, in which 0% indicates there is no 
unemployment in the locality, while 100% indicates the entire population is unemployed.   
Child poverty rate.  Because unemployment rate does not include people who are no 
longer seeking work or have exited the work force, this researcher utilizes child poverty to 
measure a third aspect of the economy.  This study is interested in juvenile arrests, as opposed to 
previous studies which were interested in detecting institutional imbalance as they relate to total 
crime rate.  Hence, instead of using poverty rate, which measures families without children as 
well as families with children, this study utilizes child poverty rates.  The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation (2016) defines the child poverty rate as the percentage of the locality’s child 
population that lives under the federal poverty line.  Because the Annie E. Casey Foundation 
(2016) counts every child living under the poverty line rather than count every household (one 
household may have multiple children), child poverty rate is a more accurate measure of youth 
poverty.  Raw child poverty data was provided in decimal form, so this researcher converted the 
measure into whole numbers for easier interpretation as well.  Child poverty rate may be as low 
as 0% (no children in the locality is living under the poverty line) or as high as 100% (all 
children within the locality are living under the poverty line).   
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Independent and moderator: Noneconomic institutions.  The present study analyzes 
the direct effects of noneconomic institutions (family, polity, and education) on crime and 
moderating effects of noneconomic institutions on the relationship between the economy and 
crime.  A weakened family/family disruption is operationalized as divorce-to-marriage ratio 
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003), polity is measured as the 
adjusted average amount of welfare aid distributed monthly per recipient (Hannon & DeFronzo, 
1998; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997), and education is operationalized as per pupil expenditures 
(Maume & Lee, 2003).   
Family.  Divorce is considered an indicator of a weakened family institution or more 
simply describes family disruption (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 
2003).  The U.S. Census Bureau (2016d) provides the percentage of a locality’s population aged 
15 and older that is married and percentage of the locality’s population aged 15 and older that is 
divorced rather than providing a divorce-to-marriage ratio.  Consequently, this researcher used 
marital status and population data from the U.S. Census to create divorce-to-marriage ratios.  To 
create the ratio, the following steps were taken: 1) the percentage of married persons aged 15 and 
older were multiplied with the total locality population aged 15 and older to determine the 
number of individuals married; 2) the number of married persons was divided by the total 
population aged 15 and older, then multiplied by 1,000 to create a crude marriage rate; and 3) 
steps 1 and 2 were repeated using percentage of divorced persons aged 15 and older to create a 
crude divorce rate.  These values were then combined in the following formula for divorce-to-
marriage ratio: number of divorces per 1,000 population (the crude divorce rate) divided by the 
number of marriages per 1,000 population (crude marriage rate) (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; 
Dolliver, 2015).  The final ratio was then multiplied by 100 to convert it into a whole number, 
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making it easier to interpretation. The sample presents a divorce-to-marriage ratio range of 12.26 
to 45.80.  A greater divorce-to-marriage ratio indicates greater divorce rates than marriage rates 
in that locality. 
Polity.  The polity is operationalized as the adjusted average monthly amount of welfare 
aid per person in a locality.  The welfare program of interest is the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families program (Virginia Department of Social Services, 2016), which was created to 
assist single mothers in providing care for their own children and reduce the risk of sending them 
into foster care (Office of the Federal Register, 1999).  Because of the program’s purpose, this 
measure is more appropriate as a measure of polity and its ability to insulate youth from adverse 
economic conditions and economic dominance. 
The average monthly welfare amount is adjusted for cost of living for increased 
comparability between localities (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; 
Maume & Lee, 2003).  This study uses the same formula proposed by Hannon and DeFronzo 
(1998) to calculate cost of living: “dividing the average monthly welfare payment by the ratio of 
the local average gross rent paid by families to the national average gross rent paid by families” 
(p. 386).  Instead of local average gross rent, the present study used housing cost data provided 
by the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2016e) American Community Survey.  The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines housing costs as rent, property/real estate taxes, home insurance payments, and utilities 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).  The range for the variable in this current study is $54.42 adjusted 
average welfare per person to $290.91 adjusted average welfare per person.  Areas with higher 
adjusted average welfare per person reflect areas with a stronger polity. 
Education.  The best measure for comparability at a county/city level is per pupil 
expenditures (Virginia Department of Education, 2012-2016).  Per pupil expenditures reflect the 
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strength of education in that such investments can improve the quality of education and services 
provided (Jefferson, 2005; Koshal et al., 2004), including teacher-to-student ratios (Jefferson, 
2005).  Locality per pupil expenditures from the 2011 to 2015 fiscal years are utilized.  The 
Virginia Department of Education reports fiscal year expenditures as expenditures from the 
previous academic year.  For example, the 2010-2011 academic year per pupil expenditures were 
reported for fiscal year 2011.  This variable ranges from $8,604 to $19,026 in the current sample. 
Control.  To disentangle the effects of competing explanations from the effects of 
variables of interest, and to reduce risk of spurious relationships, the following variables are 
controlled: population size, sex ratio, age (the percentage of the population that is aged 10 to 17), 
and race (percentage of population that is a black juvenile) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016f).  The 
population size ranges from 2,244 to 448,290.1  The range yielded from the study’s sample is 
68.3 males for every 100 females to 217.7 males for every 100 females.  Virginia localities have 
populations with 3.9% to 13.5% aged 10 to 17 and 0% to 78.5% black juvenile.  Higher sex 
ratios indicate a greater number of males to females.  Populations with a sex ratio reflecting a 
greater proportion of males should have greater juvenile arrest rates.   
Analytical Model 
Multicollinearity.  Before performing any other statistical analyses, a bivariate 
correlation analysis will be conducted to detect multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity occurs when 
predictor variables are strongly correlated (Aldrich & Cunningham, 2016; Field, 2013; 
Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012; Verma, 2013).  Conceptually, multicollinearity indicates 
the variables may be measuring the same or related construct.  Empirically, multicollinearity can 
impact confidence intervals and standard errors, which impact significance tests, and ultimately 
                                                 
1 The researcher conducted several sensitivity analyses using the natural logarithm of population because of 
the skewed distribution of the population.  Sensitivity analyses revealed that the substantive results for variables of 
interest (i.e. economic indicators and noneconomic indicators) did not change using either measure of population. 
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affect interpretation of results (Alin, 2010; Gebotys, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2012).  In an 
unbiased or efficient analytical model, correlation coefficients between predictor variables 
should be small, and correlation coefficients between a predictor and the outcome variable 
should be greater (Aldrich & Cunningham, 2016).  Generally, correlations greater than r=0.80 
may indicate potential for high multicollinearity (Berry & Feldman, 1985; Lewis-Beck & Lewis-
Beck, 1980). 
The current study’s bivariate correlation analyses on all variables of interest yield no 
Pearson r values greater than r=0.8 (see Table 1).  The greatest correlation is between 
unemployment and child poverty (r=0.761).  These two variables are economic indicators, so the 
relatively high correlation is not unexpected.  The next highest correlation is between child 
poverty and the divorce-to-marriage ratio (r=0.692).  The correlation between these two variables 
is also not unexpected because households which were once dependent on two parents for 
financial support are reduced to depending on one parent after a divorce.  To reduce possible 
problems that high multicollinearity among these variables may introduce to the analytical 
models, the predictors will be mean-centered prior to OLS regression analysis (Jaccard, Turrisi, 
& Wan, 1990; Savolainen, 2000).  Mean centering is completed by subtracting the mean of the 
variable from the variable; the transformed, mean-centered variable will have a mean of 0 (Field, 
2013; Hayes, 2013; Savolainen, 2000). 
In addition to running a bivariate correlation test to check for initial multicollinearity 
problems, the OLS regression and moderation analyses models will include variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for each variable.  VIF values greater than 4.0 may indicate the presence of high 
multicollinearity (Fisher & Mason, 1981; Fox, 1991; Savolainen, 2000).  (See Appendix C for 
tables with all VIF.)  
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Because preliminary analyses indicated high collinearity in the full model in which all 
economic and and noneconomic are included (some variables had VIF values of about 5.5), this 
researcher conducted analyses for each economic variable separately.  Taking these steps 
reduced muticollinearity in all additive and multiplicative models.  Substantive results stayed the 
same. 
 
 
Skewness.  Table 2 shows that the outcome has a skewness value of 1.175 and a standard 
error of skewness of 0.221.  The skewness value is two times greater than the standard error, 
which indicates asymmetry or skewness in the outcome distribution (Abbott, 2011; Verma, 
2013).  To correct this problem, the variable is transformed using the natural logarithm2 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000; Stucky, 2003). 
                                                 
2 A natural logarithm cannot be taken of 0, and the minimum value of juvenile arrests is 0, so this 
researcher added a constant (1) to all estimates before taking the natural log of said estimates.  The formula for 
outcome variable transformation is thus ln(viol+1).  The outcome was mean-centered for multiplicative models. 
Minimum Maximum Mean Median
Std. 
Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error 
of 
Skewness
Population Count 2,244.00 448,290.00 53,297.22 25,610.00 79,696.79 3.178 0.221
Sex Ratio 68.30 217.70 98.74 96.50 15.39 4.630 0.221
Age 3.90 13.50 9.56 9.55 1.62 -0.399 0.221
Race 0.00 78.50 20.28 15.26 18.38 0.899 0.221
Juveni le Arrest Violent 
Index Crime Rate
0.00 132.46 34.81 25.39 31.56 1.175 0.221
Gini  Index 36.46 54.01 43.72 43.27 3.94 0.369 0.221
Chi ld Poverty 4.00 41.00 21.73 22.00 8.02 0.096 0.221
Unemployment 3.38 11.60 6.64 6.53 1.55 0.748 0.221
Welfare 54.42 290.91 150.04 148.15 49.27 0.547 0.221
Divorce-to-Marriage 12.26 45.80 23.60 22.41 7.39 0.962 0.221
Edu Expenditure 8,604.00 19,026.00 10,764.92 10,312.00 1,921.01 2.307 0.221
Descriptive Statistics
n=120
Average of Data from 2011-2015
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
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Additive model.  Because the outcome variable is continuous, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression is the chosen statistical technique (Field, 2013; Hayes, 2013).  OLS regression 
measures the linear relationship between an outcome and a predictor from a given number of 
predictors (Huitema, 2011; Pollock, 2016; Scott & Marshall, 2015; Verma, 2013).  In this study, 
OLS regression will yield twelve models measuring the additive, linear relationship between 
each predictor and the outcome.  Each additive model will test only one economic indicator at a 
time, and additional noneconomic predictors will be added to examine any changes in the 
strength or direction of regression coefficients, et of all other variables.  The threshold for 
significance will be 0.05 and 0.01.3 
Multiplicative model.  To assess how each noneconomic institution impacts the 
relationship between each economic indicator and juvenile arrest rates, a continuous by 
continuous interaction term will be added to each full additive model.  An interaction term is 
created by multiplying two predictors (in this case, one economic and one noneconomic 
predictor) and represents the relationship between the predictor and outcome at different levels 
of the moderator variable (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010; Dawson, 2014).  Thus, the study will 
yield nine multiplicative models.  Although statistical significance will reveal that the predictor’s 
effect on the outcome varies by the level of the moderator, a simple slope analysis will be 
conducted to provide a test of the differences in slopes by the level of the moderator, and to 
create a graphical representation of interaction (Bauer & Curran, 2005). 
A simple slope analysis (also described as the pick-a-point approach) is completed by 
calculating the outcome when the predictor and moderator vary in value (Bauer & Curran, 2005; 
Dawson, 2014; Hayes, 2013).  In this study, low levels of the moderator variable are defined as 
one standard deviation below the mean, average levels are fined as the mean, and high levels are 
                                                 
3 All statistical analyses will be performed using SPSS version 24. 
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defined as one standard deviation above the mean (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010; Dawson, 2014; 
Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Matthes, 2009).  This study uses Hayes’ PROCESS macro program for 
SPSS (Field, 2013; Hayes, 2013), as a benefit of using Hayes’ PROCESS program is that it 
yields the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome at the various levels of the moderator 
which describe the visual representation, as well as provides significance testing of the slopes at 
each level.  The multiple line graph created by plotting the outcome values obtained from these 
calculations will serve as a visual representation of the relationship between the economic 
predictor and the outcome at low, average, and high levels of the moderator (Aguinis, & 
Gottfredson, 2010; Hayes & Matthes, 2009). 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
 
 
 
 In the following chapter, this researcher reviews the descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the analytical models.  This researcher then reviews results for the additive (direct) 
and multiplicative (moderated) ordinary least squares (OLS) analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 displays the sample’s descriptive statistics.  (See Appendix B for a full case 
summary.)  The minimum and maximum values of several variables indicate a wide range of 
variation between the locations included in the sample.  Of special note is the distribution of the 
2011-2015 juvenile violent crime arrest rate, which ranges from a low of 0 arrests per 100,000 
population to a high of 132.5 arrests per 100,000 population.  The average juvenile violent crime 
arrest rate is 34.8 arrests per 100,000 population, while the median is 25.4 arrests per 100,000 
population.  Meanwhile, localities have populations with as few as 2,244 persons or as much as 
448,290 persons for population size.  Sex ratio has a wide variation across localities with a low 
of 68.3 males for every 100 females and a high of 217.7 males for every 100 females.  
Percentage of the population who are black juveniles ranges from 0% to 78.5%.  Per pupil 
education expenditures varies widely across the sampled localities as well, with a low of $8,604 
and a high of $19,026.  Even child poverty rates vary widely across localities with a minimum of 
4% and a maximum of 41%.  These broad ranges reflect vast differences in the demographic and 
  
42 
 
socioeconomic characteristics of the locations’ populations, as well as differences in levels of 
juvenile violent crime arrests. 
 The distribution of the Gini index of income inequality exhibits the least amount of 
variation across localities.  The sampled counties and cities have Gini indices that are as low as 
36.46 and as high as 54.01.  This distribution yields an average of 43.72 as the Gini index, and a 
median of 43.27.  Virginia appears to have relative uniformity in levels of income inequality 
across its localities. 
Additive and Multiplicative Models 
 Below is a review of the multivariate analyses results.  First, this researcher will review 
the key results from the additive and multiplicative models in which the economy was measured 
by the Gini index, followed by a discussion of the results from separate models in which the 
economy was measured by child poverty, and finally a set of models in which the economy was 
measured by unemployment rate. 
Gini index of income inequality.  Table 3 presents a summary of models which analyze 
the relationship predicting juvenile violent crime arrest rates when the economy is measured by 
the Gini index of income inequality.  Models 1 to 4 illustrate the additive models, and Models 5 
to 7 illustrate the multiplicative models.  The Gini coefficient is statistically significant in the 
baseline model (Model 1), and is in the direction opposite than expected (b= -0.075, p < 0.05).  
The Gini coefficient’s negative relationship with juvenile arrest rates implies that lower income 
inequality (or less economic pressure) relates to lower levels of crime.  This finding is opposite 
to predictions according to IAT.  All demographic variables are also statistically significant in 
Model 1.  Sex ratio and percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 are each unexpectedly 
negatively associated with the outcome, however.  The direction of the two demographic   
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variables’ regression coefficients imply that localities with a greater number of males to females 
have lower juvenile arrest rates, while localities that have a population with a greater percentage 
of juveniles aged 10 to 17 will also have lower juvenile arrest rates for violent index crimes.4 
                                                 
4 Percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 was selected as the age control variable because it introduced 
less multicollinearity to the additive and multiplicative models than percentage of the population aged under 18.  For 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
6.712** 7.032** 7.118** 7.164** 4.941** 4.152** 4.105**
( -1.269 ) ( 1.248 ) ( 1.248 ) ( 1.263 ) ( 1.241 ) ( 1.254 ) ( 1.263 )
4.288E-06** 2.948E-06 2.930E-06 2.981E-06 2.246E-06 2.684E-06 2.901E-06
( 1.431E-06 ) ( 1.500E-06 ) ( 1.498E-06 ) ( 1.514E-06 ) ( 1.478E-06 ) ( 1.5133E-06 ) ( 1.514E-06 )
-0.026** -0.026** -0.025** -0.025** -0.027** -0.024** -0.025**
( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 )
-0.188* -0.205* -0.210* -0.216* -0.293** -0.236** -0.204*
( 0.083 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
0.021** 0.016* 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.011
( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
-0.075* -0.045 -0.062 -0.061 -0.067 -0.065 -0.055
( 0.033 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.038 )
-0.007* -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007* -0.008**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
0.024 0.024 0.025 0.010 0.026
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.021 )
-1.767E-05 -7.377E-06 -2.018E-05 -1.449E-05
( 6.133E-05 ) ( 5.916E-05 ) ( 6.087E-05 ) ( 6.131E-05 )
0.002**
( 0.001 )
0.006
( 0.003 )
-1.740E-05
( 1.525E-05 )
Edu Expenditure
Economy x Welfare
Economy x Divorce-Marriage
Economy x Edu Expenditure
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Predictors/moderators  were mean-centered prior to analys is
Outcome was  mean-centered prior to analys is  for multipl icative models
Gini Index: Regression Coefficients
n=120
Coefficients  are unstandardized
Standard error for the unstandardized coefficient i s  in parentheses
Constant
Population
Sex Ratio
Age
Race
Economy
Welfare
Divorce-Marriage
Table 3.  Gini Index: Regression Coefficients 
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When the polity measure adjusted average monthly welfare per person is added in Model 
2, the Gini index becomes statistically insignificant.  When controlling for Gini, adjusted average 
monthly welfare per person has a statistically significant relationship with juvenile arrests in 
Model 2.  Adjusted average monthly welfare per person is significant in all additive models, 
including the final, full additive model which includes the Gini index and all noneconomic 
predictors (Model 4).  The polity measure’s relationship with juvenile arrests is consistently 
negative, as is expected in accordance with IAT.  This finding indicates that localities with 
higher average monthly welfare per person have lower juvenile arrest rates. 
Model 5 is the first of the multiplicative models measuring the moderated effect of the 
Gini coefficient on the outcome.  The Gini x welfare interaction term in Model 5 is the only 
statistically significant interaction term (b = 0.002, p < 0.01) in the Gini multiplicative models.   
The statistical significance indicates that the Gini coefficient’s effect on juvenile violent crime 
arrest rates varies at different levels of average adjusted welfare per person.  To better understand 
the interactive relationship, this researcher created Table 4 and Figure 4 using simple slope 
analysis to examine how the effects of income inequality on juvenile violent crime arrest rates 
varies at different levels of average monthly welfare per person.   
  Table 4 shows the results of the simple slopes analysis.  The table displays the effect or 
slope of income inequality on the outcome at varying levels of welfare, and the degree to which 
the effect is statistically different.  The results in Table 4 identify at what level of the moderator 
the economy will make a significant impact on juvenile violent crime arrest rates.  The results of 
                                                                                                                                                             
example, percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 and population had a Pearson correlation value 0.152, while 
percentage of the population aged under 18 and population had a Pearson correlation value 0.376.  In the final 
additive model, percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 had a VIF value 1.6, while percentage of the population 
aged 18 had a VIF value 2.3.  Although percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 has a negative relationship with 
juvenile violent arrest rates, which is opposite than theoretically predicted, while percentage of the population aged 
under 18 has a positive relationship, sensitivity analyses show that substantive results remain the same with use of 
the percentage of the population aged 10 to 17 variable. 
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the simple slope analysis are graphically illustrated in Figure 4.  This depiction reveals that the 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and juvenile arrests for violent index crimes is negative 
and significant at low levels of the welfare distribution (b= -49.267, p < 0.01), but it is 
insignificant at average to high levels of welfare.  Thus, the economy as measured by the Gini 
index of income inequality has a significant, negative effect on juvenile arrest rates in localities 
that have low average monthly welfare amounts per person (which indicates a weak polity), 
while the economy appears to have no significant effect on juvenile arrests in localities that have 
average or high levels of average monthly welfare per person.5  Although the direction of the 
income inequality and juvenile violent arrest rate relationship is not in the expected theoretical 
direction (higher income inequality is related to less juvenile violent crime arrests), the 
interaction term does provide support for the argument that the relationship between the 
economy and crime is moderated by noneconomic institutions such as polity. 
 Child poverty rate.  Table 5 summarizes the relationships predictive of the outcome 
variable when the economy is measured by child poverty.  Models 8 to 11 are additive models, 
while Models 12 to 14 are multiplicative models.  In the baseline model (Model 8), child poverty 
is negatively associated with juvenile arrests but is statistically insignificant.  Additionally, in 
this same model, the percentage of the population that is juvenile aged 10 to 17 does not appear 
to have a significant effect on the outcome, but all other demographic variables do have 
statistically significant effects on the outcome.  As what happened in the Gini index models, the 
effect that the sex ratio has on the outcome is unexpected: localities with more males for every 
100 females have lower juvenile arrest rates.  Population size, though, is in the expected   
                                                 
5 In the final additive model in which the economy is conceptualized as income inequality and measured 
using the Gini coefficient (Model 4), all variables had VIF values less than 2.  See Appendix C for a summary of 
VIFs. 
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Figure 4: Simple Slopes Graph for Gini x Welfare 
Table 4: Effect of Gini on Juvenile Violent 
Index Crime Arrest at Varying Conditions of 
Welfare 
Effect (B) p-va lue
- 1SD -49.267 -0.163 0.004
Mean 0 -0.067 0.148
+ 1 SD 49.267 0.029 0.625
Moderator
Welfare
Predictor
Gini  Index
Conditional  Effect
Simple Slopes
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direction, in that counties and cities with greater population sizes have greater juvenile arrest 
rates for violent crimes. 
In Model 9, the model in which adjusted average monthly welfare per person is added, 
child poverty remains insignificant.  The reason for child poverty’s insignificance may be due to 
Table 5.  Child Poverty: Regression Coefficients 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
6.009** 6.050** 6.049** 6.081** 3.275** 3.222** 3.628**
( 1.223 ) ( 1.179 ) ( 1.185 ) ( 1.214 ) ( 1.231 ) ( 1.220 ) ( 1.252 )
3.831E-06* 3.245E-06* 3.249E-06* 3.265E-06* 2.855E-06 3.011E-06 3.694E-06*
( 1.562E-06 ) ( 1.519E-06 ) ( 1.533E-06 ) ( 1.544E-06 ) ( 1.614E-06 ) ( 1.564E-06 ) ( 1.558E-06 )
-0.025** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.024**
( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
-0.135 -0.136 -0.136 -0.140 -0.160 -0.162 -0.158
( 0.079 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.081 )
0.024** 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.001
( 0.007 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) (  0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
-0.026 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.032 0.044
( 0.019 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.031 )
-0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.011* -0.012**
(0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
-0.001 -2.471E-04 0.003 -0.011 -0.005
( 0.021 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.022 )
-8.312E-06 -1.455E-05 -1.157E-05 3.864E-05
( 6.286E-05 ) ( 6.332E-05 ) ( 6.293E-05) ( 6.923E-05 )
3.003E-04
( 3.396E-04 )
0.002
( 0.002 )
1.472E-05
( 9.371E-06 )
Divorce-Marriage
Edu Expenditure
Economy x Welfare
Economy x Divorce-Marriage
Economy x Edu Expenditure
Sex Ratio
Age
Race
Economy
Welfare
Child Poverty: Regression Coefficients
n=120
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Coefficients  are unstandardized
Standard error for the unstandardized coefficient i s  in parentheses
Predictors/moderators  were mean-centered prior to analys is
Outcome was  mean-centered prior to analys is  for multipl icative models
Constant
Population
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variance inflation factors (VIF).6  In this same model, adjusted average monthly welfare per 
person again has a significant, negative relationship with the outcome (p < 0.01) when 
controlling for child poverty and other factors.  The polity measure remains statistically 
significant in the final additive model (Model 11), as do the population size and sex ratio.  As for 
multiplicative Models 12 to 14, they did not exhibit any moderation effects: none of the 
interaction terms were statistically significant.  The noneconomic institutions do not appear to 
moderate the relationship between the economy and juvenile arrest rates for violent index crimes 
when the economy is measured by child poverty rate. 
Unemployment rate.  The additive and multiplicative models measuring unemployment 
rate as the economic predictor are displayed in Table 6.  Models 15 to 18 are the additive models, 
and Models 19 to 21 are the multiplicative models.  Baseline Model 15, similar to Model 8, 
yields statistically significant regression coefficients for population size, sex ratio, and 
percentage of the population that is black juvenile.  Sex ratio remains consistent in its negative 
effect on juvenile arrest rates for violent index crimes.  In the final additive model (Model 18), 
unemployment rate remains insignificant and positively associated with the outcome, while 
adjusted average monthly welfare is statistically significant and negative when controlling for 
unemployment (b=-0013, p < 0.01).  All demographic variables except for percentage of the 
population that is a black juvenile are also statistically significant in Model 18.  The percentage 
of the population that is aged 10 to 17 continues to have a negative effect on juvenile arrest rates.  
None of the interaction terms in Models 19 to 21 are statistically significant.  Thus, there is no  
 
 
                                                 
6 Child poverty has a VIF value of 4.009 in this model, which suggests presence of high multicollinearity.  
As discussed previously, high multicollinearity may affect significance tests. (See Appendix C for summary of all 
VIF.)   
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evidence that noneconomic institutions moderate the economy’s relationship with juvenile arrest 
violent crime arrest rates when the economy is measured by unemployment rate.7 
                                                 
7 In the final additive model in which the economy is measured by unemployment rate (Model 18), all 
variables had VIF values less than 3.4.  Unemployment had a VIF value of 5.1 in the model testing a possible 
interaction between adjusted average monthly welfare and unemployment (Model 19).  All variables had VIF values 
less than 4 in Models 20 and 21, which tested for the interaction between unemployment and divorce-to-marriage 
Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
5.431** 6.963** 6.923** 6.904** 4.074** 3.951** 4.146**
( 1.155 ) ( 1.183 ) ( 1.201 ) ( 1.207 ) ( 1.210 ) ( 1.208 ) ( 1.388 )
4.221E-06** 3.171E-06* 3.159E-06* 3.115E-06* 3.743E-06* 3.122E-06* 3.222E-06*
( 1.538E-06 ) ( 1.496E-06 ) ( 1.503E-06 ) ( 1.514E-06 ) ( 1.587E-06 ) ( 1.514E-06 ) ( 1.554E-06 )
-0.022** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.024** -0.026**
( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 )
-0.100 -0.186* -0.183* -0.177* -0.172* -0.194* -0.186*
( 0.074 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.076 ) ( 0.078 ) ( 0.078 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.084 )
0.022** 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.001
( 0.007 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
-0.074 0.210 0.205 0.223 0.341* 0.174 0.226
( 0.086 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.129 ) ( 0.158 ) ( 0.138 ) ( 0.129 )
-0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.015** -0.012** -0.013**
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
0.004 0.004 -0.001 4.476E-04 0.003
( 0.019 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )
2.298E-05 5.143E-05 6.416E-06 3.884E-05
( 6.669E-05 ) ( 7.010E-05 ) ( 6.870E-05 ) ( 8.210E-05 )
-0.002
( 0.002 )
0.009
( 0.009 )
1.363E-05
( 4.082E-05 )
Economy x Divorce-Marriage
Economy x Edu Expenditure
Economy
Welfare
Divorce-Marriage
Edu Expenditure
Economy x Welfare
Constant
Population
Sex Ratio
Age
Race
Coefficients  are unstandardized
Standard error for the unstandardized coefficient i s  in parentheses
Predictors/moderators  were mean-centered prior to analys is
Outcome was  mean-centered prior to analys is  for multipl icative models
Unemployment: Regression Coefficients
n=120
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table 6.  Unemployment: Regression Coefficients 
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Summary of Findings 
 Of the economic measures, only the Gini index of income inequality gave any indication 
that economic dominance and anomie affects juvenile arrest rates for violent index crimes.  The 
Gini index was statistically significant in the baseline additive model and became insignificant 
once a noneconomic institution (polity) was introduced to the model.  Of the noneconomic 
institutions, the polity was the only institution to significantly affect juvenile arrest rates in the 
additive models.  The polity also demonstrated a moderation effect on the relationship between 
the economy and juvenile arrests when the economy was measured by the Gini index.  This 
moderation effect was significant only in localities with lower average monthly welfare amounts 
per person (or weaker polities).  Thus, the economy as measured by the Gini index of income 
inequality and polity as measured by adjusted average monthly welfare yield the greatest 
evidence that institutional anomie exists, and that actions taken by the noneconomic institution to 
rectify anomie reduce juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
Demographic characteristics also generally have significant impact on juvenile arrest 
rates.  Most consistently, sex ratio significantly and negatively affected juvenile arrests, 
regardless of how the economy was measured, and regardless of the type of statistical model, 
while population size was significant and positive in all models when the economy was 
measured by child poverty rate or unemployment rate.  The percentage of the population that is 
aged 10 to 17 impacted juvenile arrests in the negative direction when the economy was 
measured by the Gini index and in every unemployment model (except the baseline model).  
Thus, localities with more males for every 100 females have lower juvenile arrest rates, localities 
with greater population sizes have greater juvenile arrest rates when the economy is indicated by 
                                                                                                                                                             
ratio, and unemployment and per pupil education expenditures, respectively.  See Appendix C for a summary of 
VIFs 
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child poverty or unemployment, and localities with a greater juvenile population between the 
ages of 10 and 17 have lower juvenile arrest rates when the economy is measured by the Gini 
index and generally when the economy is measured by unemployment.  Demographic 
characteristics, then, affect juvenile arrest rates dependent on how economic dominance is 
measured. 
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Ch. 5: Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 Using Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) as the guiding theoretical framework, this 
project examined the extent to which the economic and noneconomic institutions explain 
juvenile violent crime arrest rates in a sample of 120 counties and cities in Virginia.  IAT posits 
the economy is overvalued and dominates noneconomic social institutions (polity, family, and 
education), which creates institutional imbalance, resulting in increased anomie and economic 
pressures.  Increased anomie and economic pressure, combined with weak noneconomic 
institutional controls, relate to higher levels of serious crime.  Many previous scholars have 
conducted empirical analyses on additive and multiplicative models to measure the direct, 
indirect, and moderating effects of the institutions on macro-level crime rates (Cancino et al., 
2007; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Dolliver, 2015; Maume & Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).  This 
researcher extends this line of research to examine macro-level juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates, and posits that economic pressures, such as high child poverty rates, may contribute to high 
juvenile violent crime arrest rates.  Thus, this researcher proposed and tested seven hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Localities that have higher levels of economic dominance (measured as 
higher income inequality, higher unemployment rates, or higher child 
poverty rates) will have higher juvenile violence index crime arrest rates. 
Hypothesis 2: Localities with stronger polities (higher adjusted average monthly welfare 
per person) will have lower juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
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Hypothesis 3: The polity (measured as adjusted average monthly welfare per person) will 
moderate the effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrests. 
Hypothesis 4: Localities with higher levels of family disruption (measured as higher 
divorce-to-marriage ratio) will have higher juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates. 
Hypothesis 5: Family disruption (measured as divorce-to-marriage ratio) will moderate 
the effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
Hypothesis 6: Localities with stronger educational institutions (measured as higher per 
pupil education expenditures) will have lower juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates. 
Hypothesis 7: Education (measured as per pupil education expenditure) will moderate the 
effects of the economy on juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
 Multivariate analyses yielded no support for Hypothesis 1.  While the Gini index of 
income inequality was statistically significant in its baseline additive model, this measure of 
economic dominance lost significance once noneconomic institutions were introduced in 
subsequent models.  Similarly, the other measures of the economy (child poverty rate and 
unemployment rate) were not statistically significant in any of the additive or multiplicative 
models. 
 More consistent and empirically significant support was found for the direct effects of the 
polity on juvenile violent crime arrest rates.  The polity, as measured by the average monthly 
welfare per person adjusted for cost-of-living, is statistically and negatively associated with the 
juvenile violent crime arrest rates, net of all other economic and demographic variables.  This 
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finding supports Hypothesis 2: localities with stronger polities (as opposed to localities with 
weaker polities) have lower juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
 Analyses detected significance for only one interaction term: the interaction between the 
economy, measured as income inequality, and the polity, measured as the average monthly 
welfare per person adjusted for cost-of-living.  The Gini x welfare interaction term had a 
significantly negative effect on rates of juvenile violent crime arrests.  Results from the simple 
slope analyses indicate that in localities with low levels of welfare distribution, the relationship 
between income inequality and juvenile violent crime arrests is negative and significant.  
However, income inequality has no effect on the juvenile violent crime arrest rate in localities 
with average to high levels of welfare support.  These findings suggest that high levels of income 
inequality are associated with lower levels of crime in localities with a weak polity (low welfare 
support).  Conversely, income inequality has no effect on crime in localities that have moderately 
strong or strong polities (average to high levels of welfare support). 
Although results from the multiplicative analysis indicate that the statistically significant 
effect of income inequality on juvenile arrests is not in the theoretically expected direction 
(income inequality significantly and negatively affects juvenile violent crime arrest rates at low 
levels of welfare support), the remaining results on the Gini x welfare interaction term align with 
IAT expectations.  Income inequality has no effect in areas with a moderately strong to strong 
polity, which supports the IAT expectation that strong noneconomic institutions reduce the 
effects of the economy on crime rates.  Thus, the results indicate that the effects of the economy 
on juvenile violent crime arrest rates (positive or negative) vary according to the strength of the 
polity.  These empirical findings support Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
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Although this study found support for the direct and moderating effects of the polity on 
juvenile violent arrest rates, the study did not provide evidence of support for the direct or 
moderating effects of the other noneconomic institutions.  The effects of family disruption (as 
measured by divorce-to-marriage ratio) and education (per pupil education expenditure) on the 
outcome were insignificant.  Thus, there is no support for Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, or 7. 
 In sum, this study found support for two of seven hypotheses.  These findings, especially 
for welfare, largely agree with previous studies.  Prior studies using measures of welfare as an 
indicator of the polity’s strength have found that the polity is a predictor and moderator of crime 
(Baumer & Gustafson, 2007; Cancino et al., 2007; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 
2003; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000).  This study similarly finds that a strong 
polity predicts juvenile violent crime arrests: localities that have higher levels of average 
monthly welfare per person have lower juvenile violent crime arrest rates.  This study found no 
support for the effects of family and education on juvenile violent crime arrest rates, consistent 
with other studies which produced mixed findings on the effects of family and education on 
crime (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Cochran & Bjerregaard, 2012; 
Maume & Lee, 2003; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2009).  These findings suggest that of the 
noneconomic institutions, the polity (measured as average monthly welfare amount per person), 
is the most significant influence for reducing county/city level juvenile violent crime arrest rates. 
Policy Recommendations 
 This study and previous studies’ findings consistently find that welfare has significant 
influence in reducing crime (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003;), especially at 
low levels of welfare distribution.  For example, in a sample of 454 counties in the United States, 
Maume and Lee (2003) found that welfare significantly and negatively affects homicide rates, 
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but only up to the third quartile.  When their measure of welfare reached the third quartile, its 
relationship with homicide rates became positive (higher amounts of welfare were associated 
with higher homicide rates).  This study’s findings, similarly to Maume and Lee’s (2003) 
findings, imply that increasing polity strength only through increasing the level of welfare 
distribution has diminishing returns for reducing levels of juvenile arrests.  Thus, it is 
recommended that the polity maintain current levels of welfare distribution and address income 
inequality through additional techniques not involving the direct distribution of financial aid. 
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families is already attempting to approach income 
inequality from multiple standpoints: distribution of monetary aid and encouragement of work 
participation, among other things (Administration for Children and Families, 2016).  However, 
government approach to encouraging work participation has been crude.  Although the federal 
government has expanded child care subsidies and the Earned Income Tax Credit program, the 
government has also passed policy which financially penalize states and welfare recipients that 
do not meet work participation requirements (Administration for Children and Families, 2016).  
The guidelines for work participation also give little room for error, outlining the number of 
hours in a week or number of weeks in a year which may be counted towards work participation 
and welfare receipt eligibility (Administration for Children and Families, 2016).  Ideally, this 
researcher recommends the guidelines regarding hours and weeks counted toward work 
participation be replaced or supplemented by educational/training programs, child care, and 
transportation that is mostly if not wholly free.  According to IAT, institutional-based policies 
which aim to reduce juvenile and adult crime may be more effective if they decrease economic 
pressure while simultaneously providing multiple forms of government-based assistance. 
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Limitations 
 This study was subject to limitations which may have affected its yielded results.  
Limitations include: a short period of observation (only five years-worth of data were included 
and aggregated into a single measure); cross-sectional data and analysis (causality could not be 
established, and changes over time could not be assessed); exclusion of thirteen locations from 
the sample (attrition and sample selection bias), and measurement error (a limited set of variables 
were selected as measures of the institutions, and juvenile arrests were selected as the dependent 
variable).  The limited observation period, as well as locality exclusion may have affected the 
validity and generalizability of the findings.  The findings may change dependent on which 
localities are included/excluded in analysis, so the findings may not be applicable to all Virginia 
localities.  For example, one excluded county Fairfax County, was an outlier with a population of 
1,128,722.  Locations with larger population sizes such as Fairfax County likely have higher 
juvenile arrest rates, so inclusion of localities with larger population sizes in analysis would 
likely change the results. 
 The operationalization of crime and the institutions may have also impacted the results 
and interpretation.  As previously mentioned, juvenile arrests serve as a proxy measure of 
criminal activity.  Official records often underestimate the true rate of crime, so rates of criminal 
activity may actually be higher than rates of juvenile arrest.  As for the noneconomic institutions, 
two out of the three institutions were operationalized as variables monetary in nature.  Dolliver 
(2015) warned against using finance-based variables because doing so may lead to high 
multicollinearity in the model and confound the effects of the economy with the effects of the 
noneconomic institutions.  While this study did not find significant multicollinearity problems 
except in the case of child poverty rates, the lack of significance and inconsistent effect of the 
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family and education institutions may indicate that they were not adequate or appropriate 
measures. 
Furthermore, the economic indicator unemployment rate does not include “discouraged 
workers” (those who are unemployed but are not currently seeking work or did not seek work in 
the last four weeks at the time of the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s data collection) in the sample 
used to create the rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014; Chamlin & Cochran, 2000).  The 
difference between the official unemployment rate and unemployment rate with discouraged 
workers included, however, is marginal; the difference is a few tenths of a percentage (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2017a; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017b). 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This researcher recommends future studies on IAT consider using alternative measures of 
the economic and noneconomic institutions to explain variation in juvenile arrests.  For example, 
when operationalizing the polity, scholars may want to consider increasing the scope of welfare 
to include social security, supplementary security income (SSI), and Medicaid.  Inclusion of 
these programs in the welfare measure may provide a more multi-dimensional indication of 
welfare assistance.  For example, there are situations in which other elderly relatives instead of 
parents raise youth and request money from the government to aid in funding their childcare.  If 
the researcher is concerned with utilizing variables not financial in nature, voter turnout may be 
used as measure of a different dimension of polity strength. 
Additionally, instead of using divorce-to-marriage ratio, one may want to consider using 
measures of female-headed/single-headed households.  The divorce-to-marriage ratio is 
calculated using divorce rates and marriage rates.  Marriage rates may be generally decreasing, 
while rates of children being born out of wedlock may be increasing.  Because of these two 
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factors, using percentage of households that are female-headed or single-headed may be a more 
accurate measure of the family institution. 
Other scholars may also want to examine the effects of the social institutions on juvenile 
arrest rates for other crimes.  Prior research has indicated that the additive and multiplicative 
effects of the institutions vary depending on the type of crime (e.g. property crime versus violent 
crime, or instrumental crime versus expressive crime). 
Finally, this study assumed that the Virginia population is committed to the American 
Dream and did not include a measure of culture in the research design, although IAT discusses 
the American Dream culture at length.  Future research may benefit from examining the effect 
that levels of American Dream commitment in a population, in combination with measures of the 
weakness/strength of and institutional imbalance between the economic and noneconomic 
institutions, has on juvenile crime. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Description of Variables 
 
 
 
 
Data Source 
       Agency 
       Publication 
Variable 
Annie E. Casey Foundation 
Kids Count Data Center Child poverty rate 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics Unemployment rate 
Virginia Depart of Education 
Superintendent's Annual Report Per pupil education expenditure 
Virginia Department of Social Services 
Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Report 
Average monthly welfare per person 
Virginia State Police 
Crime in Virginia Juvenile violent index crime arrest rates 
U.S. Census Bureau 
American Community Survey 
Population 
Sex ratio 
% of population aged 10-17 
% of population that is a black juvenile 
Gini index of income inequality 
Median monthly housing costs 
Divorce-to-marriage ratio 
Note: 
1) Median monthly housing costs and average monthly welfare per person used to created adjusted 
average monthly welfare per person. 
2) Divorce-to-marriage ratio created using divorce and marriage counts provided by data source. 
 
 
Figure A1.  Variable Data Sources 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Case Summaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Location 
  Frequency Percent 
County 88 73.3 
Independent City 32 26.7 
Total 120 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Sample: Demographics 
  Population Sex Ratio 
% Pop Aged 10-
17 
% Pop that is 
Black Juvenile 
Accomack County 33,115 94.80 0.0880 0.3179 
Albemarle County 103,108 91.90 0.0990 0.0960 
Alexandria City 149,315 93.30 0.0540 0.2406 
Alleghany County 16,066 96.50 0.0890 0.0742 
Amelia County 12,777 103.30 0.0810 0.1981 
Amherst County 32,148 92.80 0.1010 0.1737 
Appomattox County 15,208 94.20 0.1030 0.2415 
Arlington County 223,945 100.10 0.0580 0.0934 
Augusta County 74,053 102.30 0.1000 0.0328 
Bath County 4,583 95.00 0.1310 0.0193 
Bland County 6,662 126.40 0.0950 0.0000 
Botetourt County 33,155 98.10 0.1170 0.0307 
Bristol City 17,524 87.10 0.0850 0.0835 
Brunswick County 16,930 110.40 0.0840 0.5857 
Buchanan County 23,486 102.50 0.0930 0.0224 
Table A1.  Sample: Location Type 
Table A2.  Sample: Demographics 
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Buckingham County 17,068 124.80 0.0970 0.3074 
Buena Vista City 6,666 85.00 0.1010 0.0000 
Campbell County 55,012 94.00 0.0990 0.1339 
Caroline County 29,349 97.80 0.0930 0.2972 
Carroll County 29,856 100.40 0.1000 0.0068 
Charles City County 7,118 97.90 0.0900 0.4805 
Charlotte County 12,313 99.10 0.1070 0.3502 
Charlottesville City 45,084 93.40 0.0580 0.2936 
Chesapeake City 230,601 95.50 0.1150 0.3087 
Chesterfield County 328,176 92.80 0.1210 0.2405 
Clarke County 14,299 96.70 0.1040 0.0557 
Colonial Heights City 17,515 86.90 0.1030 0.1949 
Covington City 5,736 108.10 0.1190 0.1735 
Craig County 5,212 92.30 0.1010 0.0068 
Culpeper County 48,424 101.50 0.1160 0.1132 
Cumberland County 9,859 100.40 0.1090 0.2835 
Danville City 42,450 84.30 0.0910 0.5657 
Dickenson County 15,463 103.10 0.1010 0.0091 
Dinwiddie County 28,110 98.50 0.0960 0.3345 
Essex County 11,151 86.10 0.1030 0.4881 
Fauquier County 67,463 97.70 0.1140 0.0549 
Floyd County 15,523 100.70 0.1030 0.0240 
Fluvanna County 26,014 84.60 0.0900 0.0900 
Franklin City 8,457 80.30 0.1140 0.6697 
Franklin County 56,315 96.20 0.0920 0.0876 
Frederick County 81,340 98.70 0.1080 0.0520 
Fredericksburg City 27,395 87.50 0.0790 0.3021 
Galax City 6,876 93.40 0.1100 0.0374 
Giles County 16,907 96.10 0.0950 0.0156 
Gloucester County 37,001 97.70 0.1040 0.0605 
Goochland County 21,721 97.70 0.1070 0.1447 
Grayson County 15,573 97.20 0.0840 0.0103 
Greene County 18,938 95.20 0.0980 0.0567 
Halifax County 35,506 90.90 0.1110 0.3943 
Hampton City 137,081 93.20 0.0970 0.5423 
Hanover County 101,340 96.20 0.1240 0.0838 
Harrisonburg City 51,388 90.80 0.0640 0.0831 
Henry County 52,580 92.60 0.0920 0.2360 
Highland County 2,244 80.80 0.0880 0.0000 
Hopewell City 22,279 89.90 0.1120 0.4598 
Table A2.  Sample: Demographics (Continued) 
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Isle of Wight County 35,740 96.00 0.1080 0.2093 
King and Queen County 7,106 106.60 0.0910 0.2611 
King George County 24,933 100.60 0.1230 0.1801 
King William County 16,097 95.40 0.1090 0.1884 
Lancaster County 11,129 89.00 0.0760 0.4399 
Lee County 25,206 110.30 0.0860 0.0068 
Lexington City 7,071 162.00 0.0390 0.2300 
Loudoun County 351,129 98.20 0.1310 0.0713 
Louisa County 33,986 97.20 0.1020 0.1556 
Lunenburg County 12,558 110.40 0.0810 0.3339 
Lynchburg City 78,158 88.60 0.0870 0.3875 
Madison County 13,147 93.80 0.0980 0.0524 
Manassas City 40,743 99.40 0.1120 0.1428 
Manassas Park City 15,625 111.00 0.1080 0.0911 
Martinsville City 13,624 82.40 0.0890 0.5181 
Mathews County 8,880 85.90 0.1110 0.0702 
Mecklenburg County 31,555 93.30 0.0930 0.3704 
Middlesex County 10,717 97.90 0.0790 0.2061 
Montgomery County 96,467 107.50 0.0700 0.0555 
Nelson County 14,858 94.30 0.1000 0.1383 
New Kent County 19,560 105.60 0.1120 0.0899 
Newport News City 181,323 93.90 0.0920 0.4753 
Norfolk City 245,452 109.10 0.0770 0.5008 
Northampton County 12,184 94.40 0.0820 0.4175 
Northumberland County 12,304 93.20 0.0890 0.4282 
Norton City 4,007 68.30 0.0920 0.0429 
Nottoway County 15,711 112.60 0.0900 0.4003 
Orange County 34,596 95.70 0.1020 0.1113 
Page County 23,843 96.50 0.1000 0.0049 
Patrick County 18,264 97.20 0.0930 0.0883 
Petersburg City 32,123 85.10 0.0810 0.7850 
Pittsylvania County 62,794 96.30 0.0920 0.2039 
Portsmouth City 96,135 92.60 0.0950 0.5888 
Powhatan County 28,207 116.20 0.0990 0.0649 
Prince Edward County 23,022 98.50 0.0740 0.4724 
Prince George County 37,380 120.70 0.1090 0.3146 
Prince William County 437,271 99.30 0.1190 0.2039 
Pulaski County 34,528 99.60 0.0860 0.0517 
Radford City 17,057 92.80 0.0710 0.1216 
Rappahannock County 7,431 98.20 0.0870 0.0278 
Table A2.  Sample: Demographics (Continued) 
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Richmond City 213,735 90.80 0.0690 0.5954 
Richmond County 8,989 135.10 0.0960 0.2383 
Roanoke City 98,736 92.70 0.0860 0.3468 
Rockbridge County 22,444 98.00 0.0800 0.0373 
Rockingham County 77,785 96.20 0.1140 0.0126 
Russell County 28,245 95.60 0.0930 0.0070 
Scott County 22,570 101.50 0.0860 0.0040 
Shenandoah County 42,724 94.20 0.0940 0.0239 
Smyth County 31,734 95.60 0.0980 0.0069 
Southampton County 18,410 110.40 0.0900 0.3215 
Spotsylvania County 127,691 96.60 0.1270 0.1705 
Stafford County 137,145 101.40 0.1350 0.1753 
Staunton City 24,193 81.50 0.0750 0.1568 
Suffolk City 86,184 92.90 0.1100 0.4500 
Surry County 6,823 96.40 0.0890 0.5023 
Sussex County 11,864 217.70 0.0610 0.5684 
Tazewell County 43,870 98.50 0.0900 0.0193 
Virginia Beach City 448,290 96.60 0.1010 0.2215 
Warren County 38,481 100.40 0.1050 0.0173 
Washington County 54,759 97.90 0.0910 0.0159 
Waynesboro City 21,150 91.10 0.0890 0.1495 
Westmoreland County 17,557 95.60 0.0850 0.3429 
Winchester City 27,168 97.80 0.1030 0.1144 
Wise County 40,530 107.40 0.0900 0.0271 
Wythe County 29,190 96.70 0.0960 0.0528 
 
 
Study Sample: Predictor and Outcome Variables 
  
Outcome 
Predictors and Moderators/Mediators 
Economy Polity Family Education 
Juv Violent 
Index 
Crime 
Arrest 
Rate 
Gini 
Index of 
Income 
Inequality 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Child 
Poverty 
Rate 
Adjusted 
Avg 
Monthly 
Welfare 
Per Person 
Divorce-
to-
Marriage 
Ratio 
Per Pupil 
Edu 
Expenditure 
Accomack 
County 
49.1256 0.4624 7.12 0.310 162.21 0.1597 10,146 
Albemarle 
County 
21.1438 0.4817 4.80 0.110 105.74 0.1706 12,405 
Alexandria City 68.4775 0.4378 3.96 0.150 88.47 0.2358 17,988 
Table A3.  Sample: Predictors and Outcome 
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Alleghany 
County 
12.5744 0.4215 6.52 0.220 204.59 0.2196 10,896 
Amelia County 29.3955 0.3973 5.94 0.180 125.99 0.1600 9,186 
Amherst County 12.1985 0.4187 6.06 0.200 154.05 0.1996 10,065 
Appomattox 
County 
11.9554 0.4256 6.48 0.230 151.95 0.2026 8,815 
Arlington 
County 
45.4560 0.4404 3.38 0.100 81.31 0.1772 19,026 
Augusta County 1.3370 0.4329 5.22 0.130 196.92 0.1780 9,351 
Bath County 0.0000 0.5099 5.20 0.160 205.56 0.2849 15,316 
Bland County 0.0000 0.3834 6.60 0.190 247.53 0.1981 9,823 
Botetourt 
County 
23.2010 0.4318 5.14 0.100 120.92 0.1629 10,032 
Bristol City 21.8429 0.4685 6.88 0.350 174.75 0.3030 10,189 
Brunswick 
County 
72.5960 0.4669 9.00 0.300 156.90 0.2642 11,467 
Buchanan 
County 
9.5148 0.4665 10.02 0.320 279.03 0.2267 11,381 
Buckingham 
County 
24.0366 0.4131 7.74 0.280 160.22 0.2161 10,628 
Buena Vista City 28.0402 0.4257 6.94 0.240 166.65 0.1726 9,563 
Campbell 
County 
10.4872 0.4246 5.96 0.190 156.92 0.2070 8,953 
Caroline County 45.0300 0.4009 7.04 0.190 105.55 0.2186 8,989 
Carroll County 3.4178 0.4426 7.76 0.260 218.01 0.2230 10,207 
Charles City 
County 
0.0000 0.4766 6.98 0.190 145.90 0.2416 13,404 
Charlotte 
County 
0.0000 0.4453 7.76 0.290 184.41 0.2315 11,250 
Charlottesville 
City 
63.7880 0.5120 4.68 0.230 142.11 0.3156 15,597 
Chesapeake City 48.2610 0.3983 5.80 0.140 86.95 0.1962 10,629 
Chesterfield 
County 
69.2644 0.4079 5.60 0.100 99.02 0.1958 9,062 
Clarke County 12.9509 0.4454 4.80 0.100 89.27 0.2682 10,343 
Colonial Heights 
City 
101.5003 0.4138 6.30 0.170 164.82 0.2595 12,090 
Covington City 0.0000 0.4297 8.16 0.260 219.42 0.3480 11,529 
Craig County 0.0000 0.4039 6.66 0.210 187.75 0.3054 10,333 
Culpeper County 70.1968 0.4036 5.38 0.150 87.98 0.1807 9,191 
Cumberland 
County 
9.4354 0.4341 6.54 0.280 131.16 0.2773 10,342 
Danville City 89.0177 0.4912 9.52 0.390 177.39 0.3359 10,955 
Dickenson Cnty 0.0000 0.4793 10.42 0.280 290.91 0.2252 10,801 
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Dinwiddie 
County 
37.0919 0.4136 6.98 0.180 125.82 0.2439 9,480 
Essex County 17.6706 0.4505 6.82 0.260 133.63 0.2489 10,378 
Fauquier County 25.7258 0.4241 4.82 0.090 80.01 0.1687 11,627 
Floyd County 0.0000 0.3962 5.22 0.200 209.20 0.2054 9,283 
Fluvanna County 25.1482 0.3876 4.82 0.110 96.70 0.1758 9,307 
Franklin City 38.2981 0.4681 9.06 0.350 124.85 0.4241 12,843 
Franklin County 28.6986 0.4377 6.02 0.220 155.64 0.1644 10,269 
Frederick 
County 
25.6127 0.3981 5.26 0.120 99.37 0.1707 10,341 
Fredericksburg 
City 
21.1612 0.4736 6.60 0.230 139.26 0.3501 12,257 
Galax City 27.7016 0.5286 8.14 0.360 199.93 0.3985 9,674 
Giles County 11.5409 0.4295 6.74 0.180 196.83 0.2623 9,447 
Gloucester 
County 
36.5573 0.3964 5.20 0.150 101.26 0.1865 9,646 
Goochland 
County 
0.0000 0.5098 5.20 0.100 94.89 0.1322 10,822 
Grayson County 7.1349 0.4692 8.76 0.290 258.74 0.2446 11,477 
Greene County 17.3127 0.3818 4.90 0.140 105.82 0.1505 9,639 
Halifax County 34.5411 0.4442 8.76 0.270 207.10 0.2427 10,007 
Hampton City 130.7151 0.4220 7.48 0.230 140.06 0.3146 10,256 
Hanover County 48.2801 0.3913 5.02 0.070 91.64 0.1647 9,160 
Harrisonburg 
City 
61.1943 0.4796 6.68 0.240 137.29 0.2230 11,689 
Henry County 51.0948 0.4356 9.28 0.310 205.13 0.2519 9,462 
Highland County 61.8934 0.4258 4.44 0.230 260.35 0.1585 18,120 
Hopewell City 46.4948 0.4255 9.56 0.320 152.91 0.4136 10,470 
Isle Of Wight 
County 
44.2472 0.4156 5.76 0.140 97.27 0.1687 9,853 
King and Queen 
County 
14.5079 0.3736 6.14 0.210 143.35 0.2272 13,236 
King George 
County 
36.3238 0.3792 5.90 0.100 83.64 0.1537 8,604 
King William 
County 
57.1847 0.3694 5.64 0.130 94.45 0.1675 9,880 
Lancaster 
County 
11.6695 0.4507 7.82 0.270 144.45 0.2549 11,843 
Lee County 0.0000 0.4601 8.02 0.360 260.19 0.2430 10,527 
Lexington City 0.0000 0.5167 8.22 0.140 149.70 0.2169 9,062 
Loudoun County 11.6987 0.3702 4.28 0.040 54.42 0.1242 12,601 
Louisa County 5.5780 0.4263 5.60 0.170 112.26 0.1561 11,252 
Lunenburg Cnty 83.3827 0.4177 6.84 0.300 170.26 0.3063 10,313 
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Lynchburg City 55.3993 0.4921 6.94 0.290 147.77 0.2669 10,819 
Madison County 14.3515 0.4510 4.40 0.180 132.40 0.1782 10,576 
Manassas City 88.4309 0.3952 5.26 0.170 98.46 0.1407 12,445 
Manassas Park 
City 
32.9412 0.3690 5.00 0.140 97.39 0.1670 10,214 
Martinsville City 52.4285 0.5272 11.60 0.370 198.30 0.4398 10,846 
Mathews 
County 
13.2485 0.3973 5.24 0.180 137.21 0.1226 10,492 
Mecklenburg 
County 
79.2267 0.4473 8.58 0.290 172.03 0.2613 9,259 
Middlesex 
County 
0.0000 0.4516 5.48 0.250 134.46 0.2059 10,133 
Montgomery 
County 
24.7747 0.4978 5.46 0.170 175.14 0.1944 10,172 
Nelson County 6.7304 0.4710 5.32 0.220 135.19 0.3200 12,124 
New Kent 
County 
69.7156 0.3790 5.06 0.100 86.12 0.1617 8,993 
Newport News 
City 
122.9195 0.4343 6.84 0.250 124.52 0.2993 10,742 
Norfolk City 132.4590 0.4779 6.98 0.300 110.98 0.3343 10,782 
Northampton 
County 
83.3247 0.4987 8.20 0.340 165.90 0.2349 11,942 
Northumberland 
County 
0.0000 0.4325 7.56 0.290 154.02 0.1426 10,404 
Norton City 25.2084 0.4907 7.52 0.340 199.61 0.4176 9,084 
Nottoway 
County 
25.3332 0.4452 5.90 0.300 141.15 0.2576 9,583 
Orange County 18.1467 0.4113 6.00 0.160 108.57 0.1974 8,983 
Page County 8.1836 0.4148 9.10 0.230 160.18 0.2279 9,431 
Patrick County 0.0000 0.4303 8.06 0.280 235.21 0.2729 9,285 
Petersburg City 129.3338 0.4577 11.32 0.410 149.69 0.3797 11,218 
Pittsylvania 
County 
6.3070 0.4153 7.12 0.220 176.52 0.2093 9,055 
Portsmouth City 46.0346 0.4257 7.96 0.300 113.40 0.3571 10,634 
Powhatan 
County 
67.0240 0.3862 5.10 0.090 89.08 0.1652 9,962 
Prince Edward 
County 
16.2888 0.4486 7.98 0.290 160.42 0.2105 11,116 
Prince George 
County 
54.2442 0.3646 6.78 0.130 94.41 0.1871 9,288 
Prince William 
County 
62.6663 0.3752 5.04 0.100 81.97 0.1545 10,430 
Pulaski County 28.0277 0.4324 6.98 0.230 184.34 0.2542 10,028 
Radford City 61.2520 0.5261 7.26 0.200 162.32 0.2925 9,458 
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Rappahannock 
County 
43.8820 0.4694 5.02 0.170 107.73 0.1346 12,887 
Richmond City 62.0435 0.5401 6.84 0.370 126.06 0.4580 13,172 
Richmond 
County 
0.0000 0.4365 5.88 0.250 148.54 0.2489 10,899 
Roanoke City 72.7376 0.4632 6.56 0.320 153.99 0.3953 11,710 
Rockbridge 
County 
14.9348 0.4342 5.74 0.180 155.31 0.2418 10,788 
Rockingham 
County 
19.1712 0.4298 5.12 0.140 154.01 0.1684 10,050 
Russell County 110.8626 0.4547 8.24 0.260 230.92 0.2000 9,388 
Scott County 18.7541 0.4647 6.58 0.260 250.41 0.1719 9,088 
Shenandoah 
County 
26.7498 0.4100 5.68 0.180 175.04 0.2050 10,211 
Smyth County 24.9600 0.4679 8.80 0.270 201.82 0.2573 9,659 
Southampton 
County 
11.1422 0.4324 5.70 0.220 139.33 0.2319 10,311 
Spotsylvania 
County 
20.3258 0.3913 5.72 0.110 83.39 0.1714 9,742 
Stafford County 27.8795 0.3712 5.50 0.080 70.91 0.1376 9,898 
Staunton City 70.3562 0.4647 5.78 0.240 194.37 0.3257 10,314 
Suffolk City 35.9143 0.4229 6.32 0.180 86.49 0.2063 9,663 
Surry County 91.6019 0.3850 6.98 0.200 126.47 0.2068 17,062 
Sussex County 22.7807 0.4365 8.80 0.280 157.53 0.3625 16,258 
Tazewell County 25.4559 0.4910 8.08 0.240 202.40 0.2189 8,928 
Virginia Beach 
City 
62.8475 0.4124 5.28 0.130 89.17 0.2255 10,891 
Warren County 4.5195 0.4092 6.14 0.160 118.39 0.2305 9,218 
Washington 
County 
17.2101 0.4561 6.16 0.210 177.97 0.2152 9,691 
Waynesboro 
City 
32.1915 0.3955 6.28 0.260 189.90 0.2484 10,013 
Westmoreland 
County 
5.9023 0.4283 6.72 0.290 127.03 0.3109 10,837 
Winchester City 9.9035 0.4644 5.88 0.230 130.04 0.3414 11,926 
Wise County 21.8776 0.4752 8.94 0.290 195.58 0.2337 9,665 
Wythe County 27.0016 0.4523 7.30 0.220 188.36 0.2458 9,246 
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Type of Location 
  Frequency Percent 
County 7 56.8 
Independent City 6 46.2 
Total 13 100.0 
 
 
 
Excluded Cases: Demographics 
  Population 
Sex 
Ratio 
% Population 
Aged 10-17 
% Population 
that is Black 
Juvenile 
Bedford County 76463 96.60 0.1040 0.0746 
Emporia City 5672 84.90 0.1200 0.6391 
Fairfax City 23402 96.30 0.0910 0.0376 
Fairfax County 1128722 98.00 0.1050 0.1010 
Falls Church City 13308 91.90 0.1250 0.0085 
Greensville County 11760 163.9
0 
0.0770 0.6429 
Henrico County 318864 89.40 0.1080 0.3288 
James City County 70673 94.00 0.1000 0.1645 
Poquoson City 12077 95.90 0.1340 0.0101 
Roanoke County 93633 91.60 0.1060 0.0733 
Salem City 25165 90.00 0.0910 0.1184 
Williamsburg City 14754 82.40 0.0430 0.2692 
York County 66471 96.60 0.1260 0.1411 
  
Table A5.  Excluded Cases: Demographics 
Table A4.  Excluded Cases: Location Type 
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Excluded Cases: Predictor and Outcome Variables 
  
Outcome 
Predictors and Moderator/Mediator 
Economy Family 
Juvenile 
Violent Index 
Crime Arrest 
Rate 
Gini Index 
of Income 
Inequality 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Child 
Poverty 
Rate 
Divorce-
to-
Marriage 
Ratio 
Bedford County 19.7407 0.4233 5.54 0.130 0.1706 
Emporia City 136.7881 0.5269 9.28 0.380 0.2339 
Fairfax City 8.2573 0.3979 4.20 0.080 0.1472 
Fairfax County 27.7183 0.4203 4.30 0.080 0.1393 
Falls Church City 0.0000 0.4558 3.76 0.030 0.1555 
Greensville County 10.3700 0.4706 7.40 0.270 0.2865 
Henrico County 36.4110 0.4476 5.54 0.150 0.2537 
James City County 56.0519 0.4371 5.26 0.110 0.1715 
Poquoson City 72.3162 0.3943 4.92 0.070 0.1476 
Roanoke County 25.5502 0.4121 4.88 0.100 0.2029 
Salem City 32.4390 0.4442 5.54 0.140 0.2558 
Williamsburg City 236.2911 0.5163 7.74 0.240 0.2901 
York County 69.7168 0.3879 5.32 0.070 0.1187 
Note: Welfare and education variables have separate tables. 
 
 
Excluded Cases: Polity 
Locality 
Adjusted Average 
Monthly Welfare Per 
Person 
Bedford County / City 134.11 
Fairfax County / Falls Church City 77.28 
Greensville County / Emporia City 162.53 
Henrico County 107.25 
James City County 94.49 
Roanoke County / Salem City 137.11 
Williamsburg City 101.63 
York County / Poquoson City 106.56 
  
Table A6.  Excluded Cases: Predictors and Outcome 
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Excluded Cases: Education 
  
Per Pupil Educational 
Expenditure 
Bedford County / City 8,867 
Fairfax County / City 13,772 
Greensville County / Emporia City 9,983 
James City County / Williamsburg City 11,072 
Falls Church City 17,275 
Poquoson City 9,498 
Roanoke County 9,637 
Salem City 10,579 
York County 9,795 
 
  
Table A8.  Excluded Cases: Predictor/Moderator/Mediator Education 
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Gini Index: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
n=120 
  
Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant               
Population 1.058 1.215 1.215 1.232 1.264 1.249 1.234 
Sex Ratio 1.122 1.122 1.127 1.128 1.135 1.139 1.128 
Age 1.484 1.494 1.498 1.599 1.746 1.632 1.628 
Race 1.072 1.177 1.659 1.671 1.683 1.691 1.675 
Economy 1.407 1.592 1.851 1.856 1.861 1.864 1.888 
Welfare   1.536 1.660 1.668 1.668 1.743 1.730 
Divorce-Marriage     1.956 1.956 1.957 2.302 1.968 
Edu Expenditure       1.174 1.178 1.175 1.176 
Economy x Welfare         1.215     
Economy x Divorce-Marriage           1.356   
Economy x Edu Expenditure             1.074 
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Child Poverty: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
n=120 
  
Model 8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Constant               
Population 1.228 1.247 1.259 1.267 1.381 1.300 1.307 
Sex Ratio 1.129 1.164 1.164 1.165 1.179 1.165 1.241 
Age 1.286 1.286 1.287 1.445 1.568 1.556 1.474 
Race 1.398 2.539 2.583 2.674 2.873 2.701 2.893 
Economy 1.764 4.009 5.006 5.217 5.373 5.342 5.336 
Welfare   3.085 3.098 3.129 3.156 3.471 3.148 
Divorce-Marriage     2.101 2.133 2.190 2.608 2.170 
Edu Expenditure       1.220 1.235 1.223 1.499 
Economy x Welfare         1.368     
Economy x Divorce-Marriage           1.722   
Economy x Edu Expenditure             1.488 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
n=120 
  
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Constant               
Population 1.177 1.226 1.227 1.236 1.366 1.236 1.291 
Sex Ratio 1.055 1.069 1.102 1.107 1.107 1.114 1.345 
Age 1.133 1.266 1.299 1.372 1.375 1.437 1.547 
Race 1.323 2.115 2.396 2.633 3.490 2.655 2.909 
Economy 1.378 2.719 2.830 3.367 5.093 3.850 3.382 
Welfare   2.678 2.746 2.896 3.193 3.164 2.905 
Divorce-Marriage     1.751 1.779 1.843 1.824 1.806 
Edu Expenditure       1.393 1.547 1.478 2.094 
Economy x Welfare         1.704     
Economy x Divorce-Marriage           1.406   
Economy x Edu Expenditure             2.182 
 
Table A11.  Unemployment Rate: Variance Inflation Factors 
Table A10.  Child Poverty Rate: Variance Inflation Factors 
